



Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE TO READERS: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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'Leaflet' Seen as Prompting Rush on U.S. Embassy

AU0604123895 Tirana DITA INFORMACION in Albanian 30 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by "M.N.": "Here Is the Document That Prompted the Albanians To Rush to the U.S. Embassy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A leaflet that one could barely call a newspaper was published for the first time, promising to come out a second time. The No. 2 interview was with a mysterious individual pretending to be Pjerin Thomai, an anti-U.S. dissident who knew very well that a peaceful anti-U.S. demonstration would take place in front of the U.S. Embassy building on 24 March. Was this the initiative of a man with a fantasy that exceeds normal limits, or was he urged on by certain groups interested in a possible brouhaha at the U.S. Embassy, or both? Meanwhile, hypotheses and counterhypotheses were put forward in various newspapers: This is the Sigurimi's (Security) deed or: "No, it has nothing to do with the Sigurimi."

Along with the interview in the so-called leaflet, entitled METEOR, printed by a mechanic press stamp and Xeroxed on some illegal machine, an interesting letter is published, addressed "respectfully" to the U.S. ambassador by dissident Pjerin Thomai, in which he invites the ambassador to leave Albania. After giving the history of the road on which Albanian xenophobia has passed through centuries, he deals in details with the evolution of the U.S. mania that is resulting in hate against "the disgusting U.S. pragmatism." An interesting sentence that shows the unconscious sympathy of the "dissident" states the following: "The minuses that you are suffering here and in the international arena—to our surprise as well as yours—correspond to the forecasts of the dictator Enver Hoxha and his clique. Therefore, it remains your task, Mr. Ambassador, to decide whether this thing is an irony of history or engineered and calculated by the Sigurimi of Enver Hoxha and Ramis Alia and their leftovers, who, being at the head of this country, are translating their scenario into practice."

It was perhaps this sentence that made some of the newspapers believe that all this is a deed of the former State Security.

In the end, apart from predicting a victory of West Europe over the United States in the Balkans, Thomai defines U.S. pragmatism by the following terms: "It does not matter much to you who is cooking the dish but rather who brings it to you."

Notwithstanding the fact, whether it is Pjerin and his leaflet that are causing the continuous assaults on the U.S. Embassy, it is a sorry thing to see that Albanians still believe that embassies will open their doors, and that they still hope to gain some advantages from it.

3 Tirana Court Senior Judges Submit Resignations

AU0604183395 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 31 Mar 95 p 1

["Declaration by the Three Resigning Tirana Court Senior Judges"; issued in Tirana on 30 March]

[FBIS Translated Text] We, the leaders of the Tirana District Court—Agim Bendo, chairman; Artan Zeneli, deputy chairman; and Andi Celiku, deputy chairman—declare that we submit our resignation, as of 31 March 1995, from our duties of running this court for the following reasons:

First, we disagree with the control that the justice minister, Hektor Frasheri, and his deputy minister, Valdimir Kristo are attempting to impose on our court, something these gentlemen are doing overtly and in defiance of the law on "Organization of Justice" and the law on "Prerogatives of the Justice Ministry," as well as of the well-known principle of the independence of the judiciary.

More concretely speaking, on the basis of the law "On the Prerogatives of the Justice Ministry," this ministry enjoys the sole right of administrative control over the court. However, contrary to the law, Hektor Frasheri and his deputy, Kristo, because of both incompetence and malice, have oriented this control over the court toward [passage indistinct] such as the decision on suspending or annulling trials, carrying out expert work, etc., when it is common knowledge that such acts of the judges and court can be an object of consideration only by the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, and the plenum of the Supreme Court. In this respect, we have expressed our relevant objections to the justice ministry in the presence of our court personnel at the discussion of the conclusions reached during an audit made earlier in February this year. We, for our part, emphasized that these acts, which run counter to the very well-known principle of the independence of the courts and judges, affect objectivity of judgement and create the image that the decisions taken by the court are dictated by the executive power (the justice ministry).

However, Minister Frasheri, for his part, has stated that he "will act in the same way even in the future" because he is the minister and knows what he was doing. This can be verified from the protocol of the meeting and the relevant tape recordings made on that occasion.

Second, Minister Frasheri and his deputy Kristo have gone out of their way to place under their control the Tirana Court and its leaders through monopolizing the appointments and dismissals of judges and administrative personnel. In the meantime we clarify that this is a prerogative of the Supreme Council of Justice. The minister of justice has the right only to make proposals. His previous proposals in all cases have been subjective and not in compliance with any criteria. For all the proposals concerning measures against, or appointments

of, various judges to this court, the leading body of this court has never been asked to give its opinion about the people working in this institution, because this has been considered unnecessary by Minister Frasheri. In addition to this, it is very surprising to see how a minister or a vice minister has, in an open affront to the law, undertaken to appoint or fire administrative personnel such as secretaries, bailiffs, drivers, process servers, etc., bypassing the presidency of the Tirana District Court. They have even acted contrary to Ministry of Justice Order No. 1048, dated 17 May 1995. Thus, monopolizing in an exclusive way all the issues regarding the cadres of the Tirana Court, Minister Frasheri and his deputy Kristo are striving to place the courts, judges, and administrative personnel under threat of sacking them, which damages badly the process of running and managing the work in the District Court, because of the formal role with which it is left in these circumstances.

Finally, we as leaders of the largest court of the Republic do not have any confidence in the person of Mr. Frasheri, who has been convicted by the Tirana District Court on the criminal charge of "gambling" in a group of 15 other gamblers. We are of the opinion that at least from the moral point of view, he cannot be our minister. Likewise we do not trust his deputy, who in three years of work in our court has visited us only twice and has never accomplished his duties. He has even manifested tendentious stands toward this court. It is sufficient to mention that assistance by this ministry has been totally lacking, and apart from the control once a year, it has done nothing to carry out its most important function of training judges and [passage indistinct] and professional level.

Under such conditions, running this court has become impossible for us. Therefore we publically declare our resignation from our leading posts, and we will engage simply in our sublime duty to be judges.

Spokesman Denies Receiving U.S. Note on Embargo

AU0604210495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Announcer-read statement from foreign ministry spokesman; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] A statement by a spokesman for the foreign ministry says that, when asked about the news reported by various mass media according to which the United States has officially protested to the Albanian Government about the violation of the embargo, the spokesman declares that there is no official demarche by the United States or anyone else in this direction. The Government of Albania supports and implements the UN sanctions in cooperation with the international institutions that help for this purpose.

The Government of Albania has taken the necessary measures to avoid the violation of sanctions through the smuggling of fuel.

The Government of Albania has also supported not lifting the embargo against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro, and demands that the embargo be related to the solving of the Kosova issue.

The Government of Albania has asked international institutions to help supply it with the necessary means to tighten further the regime of the embargo. This wave of misinformation comes precisely at the time when, thanks to the efforts and commitment of the Albanian authorities, violations have been drastically reduced, and when the coordinator general of sanctions, Mr. Napolitano, has admitted and asked pardon for the inaccuracy of reports presented to the OSCE at the end of last year by the Center of Coordination of Sanctions in Brussels, Belgium.

The Albanian Foreign Ministry also reserves the right to think that certain circles are interested in weakening Albania's stance toward conditioning the embargo against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro on the solution to the Kosova problem. The Foreign Ministry guarantees its full cooperation with international structures for implementing the embargo, with the UN Security Council, with the office of the general coordinator of sanctions, etc.

'Strict Measures' for Observance of FRY Embargo

AU0704075195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 4 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Interior Ministry reports that, in the implementation of Council of Ministers Decision No. 541, dated 14 November 1994, on further tightening the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro, the ministries of interior and finance have defined and imposed strict measures in observing the embargo.

The order and finance police authorities have blocked several fuel points that were located near the border. Strict regulations have been imposed against fishing vessels on Lake Shkoder. Albanian vessels are prohibited from sailing on the Buna River. The checkpoints set up in several key places on national roads—such as those of Lac, Bune, Velipoje, Koplik, etc.—control every movement of fuel tankers heading north.

The finance police authorities have themselves confirmed that the amount of fuel moving north is within the normal limits for domestic needs. The situation is under constant control, as there are also ministry teams observing the implementation of measures taken in this area.

Sanctions Coordinator Denies Embargo Violated

AU0704075295 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Report by Zamira Koleci on news conference by Customs Director General Arben Petrela, in his capacity as

Albanian coordinator of sanctions, held in Tirana on 6 April; Petrela statements recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In response to the concern caused by an article in the 2 April NEW YORK TIMES that has sparked many comments recently by the Albanian press regarding Albania's observance of the UN embargo against the former Yugoslavia, the Albanian coordinator of sanctions, Arben Petrela, gave a news conference today. In a statement, Mr. Petrela underlined the official stance toward the sanctions:

[Petrela] The Albanian thesis that observing the sanctions should be conditioned with the solution to the Kosovo issue has been reiterated by the country's highest authorities. In this framework, it is meaningful to argue that the Albanian political line goes toward tightening the sanctions and rigorously implementing them.

[Koleci] Apart from the considerable damage to our economy, Albania's good will to observe sanctions, according to Petrela, has been actualized in expeditiously issuing and completing the national legislation in conformity with the UN resolutions.

[Petrela] As to what has been announced by the international sanctions bodies, this legislation has been found to be complete. Even parts of it have still not been approved by other neighboring countries with Serbia and Montenegro. [sentence as heard]

[Koleci] Mr. Petrela considered THE NEW YORK TIMES article to be a nonrealistic tendency. Regarding this, Petrela explained in a press statement:

[Petrela] We regretfully find a nonrealistic tendency in the facts reported in THE NEW YORK TIMES article, which states that in just the first two weeks of February, 12,442.5 tonnes of fuel have been imported, according to the Albanian customs authorities.

We should stress the fact that according to the statistics by Albanian customs, it comes out that during February, 4,962 tonnes of gas oil, 5,571 tonnes of kerosene, 88 tonnes of lubricant oil, 3,035 tonnes of gasoline, and 22.7 tonnes of benzol have been imported, thus totalling 13,678.7 tonnes of fuel—amounts that are equal to the fuel imports in January of this year.

As regards the figures of domestic consumption in the northern areas, the article refers to 1,583 vehicles for this area, at a time when Shkoder alone possesses 12,422 vehicles, according to Interior Ministry statistics. Moreover, as is known, fuel is used not only for vehicles.

[Koleci] According to Mr. Petrela, the import of fuel in Albania has undergone a significant decrease during the February-March period. During the first three-month period, the average daily flux in the northern areas has been so low that it has created problems in meeting the area's needs.

Petrela says the figures given by the Albanian Finance Police have been misinterpreted. Petrela went on to say

that, regarding this, during a visit to Tirana in February, the general coordinator of sanctions in Brussels, Antonio Napolitano, asked the Albanian authorities to pardon him. Mr. Napolitano has made efforts to correct these figures to which the U.S. newspaper refers.

[Petrela] The figures and elements reported in the article constitute nothing but a distortion of the truth. I consider it a duty of the Albanian authorities to avoid such events and to throw light on the reality. Moreover, such interpretations are not at all encouraging, in view of all the efforts that the Albanian authorities have made, and are making, to observe the sanctions rigorously and eliminate their violations.

Schengen Agreement To Benefit Albanian Citizens

AU0504172795 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 29 Mar 95 p 1

[Article by Fatos Baxhaku: "Half of Europe Opens Its Borders to the Albanians"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tirana—Seven European countries have opened their doors to the Albanians on the single condition that they first acquire an entry visa to at least one of the Schengen countries; then there will be no more borders for them. An agreement among Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain has made it possible for people to move about more freely from one country to another. As of 26 March, Albanians, too, can benefit from this agreement if they are issued a visa by one of these countries. Italy and Austria are expected to sign this agreement soon. [passage omitted].

Right-Wing League Criticizes Draft Law

AU0604183595 Tirana LIRIA in Albanian 29 Mar 95 p 3

["Declaration of the Albanian Right-Wing League"; date and place of issue not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a news conference on 22 March 1995, President Berisha announced that the draft law on land transaction will be sent soon to the parliament for approval, based on Law No. 7501 of 10 July 1991, approved by the People's Assembly and signed by former President Ramiz Alia, Enver Hoxha's heir. This law's approval and implementation by the democratic parliament that emerged from the elections of 22 March 1992 will go down in history as a shameful and unexplainable act. Passing the law on land transaction, without first abrogating Law No. 7501 and without restoring the land to its legitimate owners who [word indistinct] will mean that today's state will present the future parliament and government with an accomplished fact and legally sanction forever the communist rulers' theft of the land and put the legitimate landowners with their backs to the wall.

The Albanian Right-Wing league, which has in its program the restoration of private property on the basis of the legal state and market economy, will resort to all possible means not to allow the law on land transactions to enter into force. It is not only a matter of protecting the unshakable property principle, but also of preserving social peace. It is for this purpose that the Right-Wing League appeals to the parliament, the president, and the government to renounce—as it is not too late—any thought of introducing the land in the free market under the present situation. The Leninist Law No. 7501 has caused tragic conflicts, many people have lost their lives, and others, former political persecutees, have returned to the prisons of democracy for the sake of this law. We are telling the government that the owners will not stand by with their arms folded, watching their land, once stolen from them, by the former communist regime be sold off, killing any hope of correcting this injustice in the future. Let us think how to ease tensions, and not increase confusion and splitting, which lead to fratricide.

Seeing the chaotic situation created by the land's division, let the law on land transactions remain a prerogative of the future parliament, which should resolve this great national problem in compliance with the laws existing laws in all democratic countries in the world.

[signed] Kurt Kola, chairman of the Right-Wing League and chairman of the Association of Former Political Persecutees

Hysen Selfo, deputy chairman of the National Front Party

Remzi Ndreu, chairman of the Democratic Unity Party

Guri Durollari, chairman of the Legality Movement Party

Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party

Haki Hajdari, chairman of the Former Kulaks [economic persecutees]

Zhelev, Tsochev Assess ROK, Mongolia Visits

AU0604165395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 6 April, the official visit of President Zhelyu Zhelev to Mongolia ended. Prior to this visit, President Zhelev visited South Korea.

At the Sofia airport, where the president arrived a few moments ago, he was asked by our correspondent Silviya Velikova about the political and economic results of the visits:

[Begin Zhelev recording] I think the visits produced more economic results. In addition to the political meetings, most of our meetings were with economic groups, representatives of their greatest companies: Hyundai, Samsung, and others. [end recording]

Ministers from Zhan Videnov's cabinet and businessmen were members of the official Bulgarian delegation that accompanied President Zhelev to South Korea and Mongolia. This is the assessment of Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev regarding the results of the visits:

[Begin Tsochev recording] The results conform to our expectations. There is a rather intensive activity in South Korea in anything related to investments in Bulgaria and participation in the privatization in our country. We also discussed increasing our trade exchange. I think it could increase if certain positions are revised. According to their figures, the trade exchange encompasses 54 million [currency not specified]. I think this figure is correct, because those are Bulgarian goods that have entered South Korea. The tendency is to increase the trade exchange.

Several documents have been signed by our state organizations. [end recording]

Russian Expert Discusses Cooperative Projects

AU0604171495 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 4 Apr 95 p 9

[Interview with Aram Abagyan, general director of the Russian Scientific Research Institute on the Utilization of Nuclear Electric Power Plants, by Eleonora Petrova; place and date not given: "Experience of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant in Safety Is Considerable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petrova] What is the goal of your visit to the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant?

[Abagyan] Together with Bulgarian colleagues we will discuss joint projects in the field of nuclear power supply, and will mark our future cooperation. The experience of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is exceptionally useful for many Russian nuclear power plants, as well as for many similar facilities in other countries, which used to belong to the former USSR.

The leadership of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant demonstrated a prudent policy in anything related to the safe exploitation of the power plant. I mean the methodical approach to modernizing all systems of the plant. The functioning of the six reactors during the winter proves this.

[Petrova] Recently, Mr. Ashot Martirosyan, department head of the Armenian government "Armgosatomnadzor," visited Bulgaria. He said the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] experts have recommended utilizing the Bulgarian experts' experience during the repeated attempts to reactivate the Armenian nuclear power plant, which was shut down after the earthquake. What is the situation at present?

[Abagyan] I visited the Armenian nuclear power plant two weeks ago. Perhaps in May the refueling of the plant with Russian nuclear fuel would begin, and it will be restarted in the summer. I think the Bulgarian experience will be very useful, because the Armenian reactors are identical to those of Kozloduy. In addition, the Armenians are close to the Bulgarians from the psychological point of view, and this is an important factor.

[Petrova] Will you construct new nuclear power plants in Russia?

[Abagyan] Yes, the nuclear power supply will continue to develop. First we will activate the reactors that are almost ready. Those are the five reactors of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, reactor No. 3 of the Kalinin [Kalininskata] Nuclear Power Plant, and reactor No. 1 of the Rostov Nuclear Power Plant. Afterward, we will construct new reactors in Kursk, which will replace the old reactors that will be taken out of operation. We also will implement many projects related to improving safety.

Defense Ministry Official on Talks in Moscow

AU0604180395 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech
4 Apr 95 p 3

[Interview with Jaromir Novotny, head of the Foreign Relations Department at the Defense Ministry, by Jan Krupka in Prague; date not given: "The Czech Republic Trains Russian Officers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jaromir Novotny, M.Sc., director general of the Foreign Relations Department at the Defense Ministry of the Czech Republic, has just returned from Moscow, where he held talks with the Russian side. Upon his return, he gave an interview to DENNI TELEGRAF.

[Krupka] Could you evaluate the just-completed talks in Moscow?

[Novotny] Staff-level talks took place last week between the Army of the Czech Republic and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I consider the very fact that they actually took place a great success for both parties. The institution of staff-level talks is common among the NATO countries. We introduced this form of talks in 1993. We conduct such talks with the NATO-member countries, our neighbors, the Western European Union (WEU) associate countries, Russia, and Ukraine. If you realize that Russia holds staff-level talks only with the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, and Canada, we are not faring so badly.

We are attempting a dialogue with the Russian Armed Forces. It is not our objective to isolate that country. Every meeting, when you can communicate directly, is better than learning your partner's opinion from a third party. At a time when the discussion on the expansion of NATO is gathering momentum, such talks are more than just useful. I would assess the talks as very open, whereby we have not avoided any controversial problem areas. Moreover, I had an opportunity to meet outside the staff with President Yeltsin's assistant, Mr. Ryurikov, in the Kremlin. This conversation, too, was very open, although we held very different views on NATO expansion, for instance.

[Krupka] On what issues did you agree and on which ones did you not agree?

[Novotny] We discussed four kinds of issues. The first were questions of European security, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the WEU, NATO, and the Partnership for Peace. Our views on the expansion of NATO and the role of NATO in Europe differed substantially. Our partners oppose the expansion, and their arguments are identical to those of Mr. Kozyrev's Foreign Ministry or the latest appearances by the Russian president.

We tried to explain that an extension of the stability and democracy zone is an advantage for everybody rather than the opposite. Moreover, if we join NATO, it does

not mean that we are enemies. Furthermore, we believe that it is our business, and no one can solve it for us, over our heads. The other problem areas included discussions on our experience with the preparation of the Open Skies treaty, changes in the structures of the Defense Ministry (MO) and the General Staff, and the transformation of the two armies. The last was reciprocal information. We differ in this sphere in that civilians can work in our MO structure, while in Russia the defense minister is not a civilian, nor is something like that expected in the foreseeable future.

One of the areas discussed was the exchange of experiences of work in UN and OSCE peace missions. We invited Russian officers to our two training courses, which we are organizing in our facilities this year for low-ranking commanders and observers. Last year, we had participants from 18 countries. In the end, we discussed the possibilities of conceivable repairs of military equipment on an exchange basis. Aircraft made here are used in Russia, for instance, and Russian-made aircraft fly here. Both sides have problems with the repairs.

[Krupka] What are your personal impressions from the talks?

[Novotny] Although we held different opinions, the talks were conducted in a correct atmosphere, the exchange of views was matter-of-fact, and the specific character of the development in each country was respected. We agreed that the staff-level talks will continue next year in Prague.

'Serious Discrepancies' Found in Army Finances

LD0604231395 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 2100 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Control Office [NKU] has found serious discrepancies in the finances of the Czech Army. According to NKU press officer Jitka Vavrova, the discrepancies reach hundreds of millions of Czech korunas.

For instance, in one unit of the 2d Mechanized Brigade in the town of Susice [southern Bohemia], equipment worth 30 million Czech korunas was lost or damaged.

The Ministry of Defense transferred assets to other parties illegally when it sold 50 Tatra-850 trucks worth a total of 17 million korunas in February 1993.

Other damages costing millions of korunas were caused by wrongly negotiated agreements regarding payable transfers of military equipment, such as aircraft and armaments.

Wages and benefits for emergency duties were also paid out illegally. Last summer more than 5,000 civilian workers received an unauthorized salary increase totaling approximately 6 million korunas.

The Ministry of Defense has appealed the NKU's findings.

Foreign Minister on Direction of Foreign Policy

LD0604222795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1930 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During the afternoon at the sixth session of the Slovak parliament, Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk reported on Slovak foreign policy for 1994.

Schenk described the efforts to join the European Union as the first priority of Slovak diplomacy. He confirmed that an official application and a memorandum would be prepared by 30 June 1995.

Minister Schenk said that signing the basic treaty between Slovakia and Hungary was a success of Slovak politics and a contribution to the Stability Pact.

Juraj Schenk described relations with Russia as decent and unambiguously concentrating on trade and economic cooperation. Slovakia regards Germany, primarily Bavaria, as the most important partner for investments. According to the foreign minister, relations with the Czech Republic were taking a more standard shape during the last year.

The sixth session of parliament continues tomorrow.

54 Ambassadors Summoned to Bratislava

AU0604181395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers on 4 and 5 April report on the summoning of 54 Slovak ambassadors to Bratislava for 11 days of "consultations" and speculate on the motives of this undertaking.

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 4 April on page 2 carries a 250-word TASR report entitled "Paths of Foreign Policy." The report states that an 11-day "working meeting of 54 heads of embassies and permanent missions of the Slovak Republic abroad" opened in Bratislava on 3 April with a speech by Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk "on the principal issues and tasks of Slovakia's foreign policy." According to the report, the aim of the "consultations" is to brief Slovak diplomats "on the topical issues and tasks of foreign policy arising from the Slovak Government Policy Statement and to present a summary report on the domestic political situation and on the government's intentions in all spheres of its activity."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 4 April on page 3 carries a 1,100-word article by Eduard Kukan, minister of foreign affairs between March and December 1994 and currently a Democratic Union deputy, entitled "Professionalism and Defense of Slovakia's Interests in Foreign Service." Referring to the summoning of Slovak diplomats for consultations to Bratislava, Kukan says: "The results are being awaited with great interest and, among many participants, with considerable misgivings. In the recent past, in connection with the not exactly best reputation of Slovakia in the world, several representatives of the present government coalition pronounced

judgments to the effect that the Slovak foreign service is also to blame because, supposedly, it is unable to present correctly and with sufficient emphasis our country's proper image abroad, which is why it will be necessary to analyze how well suited individual diplomats are for this task." As Kukan deduces from "many statements" by representatives of the government coalition, "the main criterion of the diplomats' performance will be how 'good Slovaks' they are. According to some, though unofficial, reports, this should even be the main contents of the consultations. The above criterion is to be supplemented with an inquiry into when the diplomats were dispatched—whether it was during, before, or after Prime Minister Moravcik's government. Another factor that is to play a role is whether the people in question are the former prime minister's friends or acquaintances."

Kukan expresses the hope that the above "information, which is being frequently mentioned in conversations," will turn out to be false and that no one will have to leave the foreign service "only because he personally knew, or cooperated with representatives of the previous government." He warns that "the assessment of the performance of the chiefs of our diplomatic missions according to the above criteria would damage and weaken our foreign service and its functioning." The former minister stresses that "good defense of Slovakia's interests presupposes professionalism and knowledge of the diplomatic craft" and warns that "giving priority to the 'national' criterion and placing it categorically above all other criteria is wrong and shortsighted."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 5 April on page 2 carries a 400-word "ik"-attributed report entitled "Jozef Sestak Does Not Rule Out Personnel Changes" on a briefing held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 April. The report states: "The 11-day working meeting of 54 heads of embassies and permanent missions of the Slovak Republic abroad, which started in Bratislava on 3 April, has not yet dealt with possible personnel changes, Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told yesterday's briefing. 'I do not rule out personnel changes, but they will be carried out, first and foremost, on the basis of assessing the performance, results, and effectiveness of the diplomat in question and his team,' Jozef Sestak stressed. He noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has worked out analyses of individual workplaces abroad and that the consultations will also concern streamlining the network of diplomatic missions. According to Jozef Sestak, no comparable consultations have been held in Slovakia since the founding of the independent republic. 'This is why I am astonished that one former minister dares criticize what he himself failed to do,' Jozef Sestak added."

Dismissal of Hungarian Principal Triggers Protests

AU0604181295

[FBIS Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers of 4 and 5 April devote attention to the aftermath of the "first

all-Slovak meeting of Hungarian teachers" held in Roznava on 31 March, which representatives of the Slovak Ministry of Education left prematurely in protest against the organizers' refusal to conduct the meeting in Slovak.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 4 April on page 1 carries a 250-word "kay"-attributed report entitled "Dismissed Principal of Hungarian Elementary School Was Co-Organizer of Teachers' Meeting." The report states: "Jan Lesko, director of the Roznava School Administration, yesterday dismissed Alexander Toth, principal of a Hungarian-language elementary school. While the director denies this, the decision is a consequence of the incident at the 31 March First All-Slovak Meeting of Hungarian Teachers in Roznava, which rejected the request of a Ministry of Education representative that the deliberations be conducted in Slovak. Alexander Toth was one of the organizers of the Hungarian teachers' meeting."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 5 April on page 2 carries an 800-word interview with Zoltan Sido, chairman of the Union of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia (ZMP), by Jarmila Horakova entitled "A Guest Should Not Determine the Conditions." According to Sido, the dismissal of Principal Alexander Toth was not the only consequence of the Roznava incident: "Erika Jancovicova, head of the Roznava District Methodological Center, and Irena Arvaiova, the Roznava School Administration desk officer for kindergartens, were dismissed along with Principal Toth. All three participated in organizing the Hungarian teachers' meeting." Sido voices the suspicion that the Education Ministry representatives' "demonstrative walkout" had been "prepared in advance" and that it "could be tied up" with the Hungarian teachers' unanimous disagreement with the ministry's plans to introduce "alternative schools" in Hungarian-speaking parts of Slovakia, in which some subjects would be taught in Slovak.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 5 April on page 2 carries an 800-word "mm, er"-attributed report by the paper's Komarno and Roznava correspondents entitled "Year of Tolerance—Slovak-Hungarian Style." The report, which describes the 31 March Roznava incident, includes an interview with ZMP Chairman Zoltan Sido, in which he says: "I told L. Bencova, director of the Education Ministry's department for schools in ethnically mixed areas that, in keeping with our statutes, Hungarian is our language of deliberation, but I provided her with an interpreter. I asked Mr. Mathe to interpret for our guests. Mr. Mathe replied, however, that the director had already refused his offer when he wanted to interpret for her right after her arrival. In spite of this, I asked him to take over the role of interpreter. He sat down in the row behind her, whereupon the director got up and walked out, along with the Ministry of Education press secretary, one reporter, and the director of the Roznava School Administration." According to the PRAVDA report, the ZMP has

addressed a letter to Minister of Education Eva Slavkova, in which it protested against L. Bencova's conduct at the Roznava meeting and asked for "action to be taken against the director of the Roznava School Administration" because he dismissed Principal Alexander Toth without obtaining the opinion of the local school board, thereby "consciously violating Law No. 542 of 1990." The report also mentions that on 4 April "some 300 citizens of Hungarian nationality staged a protest in front of the Hungarian-language elementary school in Roznava against the dismissal of Principal Alexander Toth," which was addressed by "representatives of Hungarian cultural organizations and political parties." A message from the Budapest-based World Federation of Hungarians was also read. According to PRAVDA, the speakers protested "against the violation of valid laws and the Charter of Human Rights" and announced their intention to raise the issue of "the popular and distinguished principal's unlawful dismissal" in parliament.

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 5 April on page 2 carries a 500-word "so"-attributed report entitled "Roznava Protests Against Dismissals." The report quotes Jan Lesko, director of the Roznava School Administration, as saying that he "insists" on the dismissals, despite the protest rally held in Roznava. Lesko justifies the move by saying that the Roznava teachers' meeting, originally planned as a "methodology day," was "mainly used for the promotion of political ideas on cultural and educational autonomy." The teachers' presence served as mere "staffage" for "monologues of representatives of political parties," Lesko says. He also mentions that Principal Toth will remain at the Roznava Elementary School as a teacher and that Mrs. Jancovicova, too, will continue working with the Roznava School Administration.

Spokesman on Meciar's Comments on SIS, Kovac
LD0604170895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following another debate, deputies of the National Council have passed the last of the three bills returned by the president of the Republic to parliament: 78 of the 127 deputies present voted for the bill on the organization of ministries and other central bodies. [passage omitted]

Our correspondents Jarmila Tosecka and Zuzana Stukovska now report from parliament:

[Correspondent] We have witnessed one special event—the appearance of Jan Findra, head of the office of the Slovak president. Explaining his request to speak during the discussion, he pointed out that, after the passing of the amended bill on the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] on 5 April, he had no opportunity to speak. A point was made that in this kind of situation only the president himself, not his representative, was allowed to speak, unless all deputies granted their approval. However, in the end, the session's chairman, Augustin Marian Huska,

allowed Jan Findra to speak all the same. Here is the full recording of Jan Findra's address to the Slovak National Council.

[Begin Findra recording] The prime minister's address to the National Council of the Slovak Republic yesterday, dealing with the amended bill on the SIS and returned by the president, constituted a pitiful example of selling suppositions and disinformation for indisputable facts and deeds. I do regret that it served as yet another piece of evidence that there was no sincerity in the reconciliation offered at the time the government was being formed.

It is regrettable that the prime minister cannot distinguish between past events that really did take place and his subjective ideas as to what has or might have been. The evidence supporting that all he said was true is to be supplied later on, when the special body investigating the SIS presents its report to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. But what mattered yesterday was that you should believe what the prime minister said and that you should vote accordingly. Alas, many of you fell into the trap. I trust that soon you will be able to learn the truth. For myself, I must admit that I do not believe what the prime minister said.

I expect that the former SIS leadership will comment on the accusations against the organization. In this regard I would like to provide a brief reaction only to utterances and issues aimed at the president of the Slovak Republic:

The prime minister said that the least I [President Michal Kovac] should have done was to distance myself by saying that I did not know about all of the various things or that the information did not reach me. I am glad to say that there is nothing I should distance myself from because the events mentioned by the prime minister did not take place.

The written information I used to receive from the SIS did not include anything mentioned by the prime minister, and there is evidence to support this. One point in the prime minister's statement was true, however. I am indeed convinced that HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] Chairman Meciar has been and is setting up illegal parallel intelligence structures aimed not only at the president but also at other people. The prime minister indirectly admitted this in his address yesterday. In connection with his request for reexamination by criminal investigation bodies of spying on his person, he said that because, and I quote—they did not know what to do with my request I got on with the job myself. I gave them names and addresses. Meciar went on to say—I even put down in writing who was occupying which office and I gave them evidence of the falsification of investigation documents in order to prevent rectification of things. End quote.

Esteemed ladies, esteemed gentlemen, esteemed deputies: The prime minister stated that he stood by every word he said and that conversations and documents

collected before his address would support all his claims. He added that he had not collected the information single-handedly but that a lot had been done by others, by properly authorized bodies. In this context, I am duty bound to tell you that last week the now former SIS Director Vladimir Mitro informed me that members of the special audit body, which investigates SIS members, grossly violated Law No. 46/1993 because they conducted the investigations without first lifting the pledge to silence. According to Paragraph 23, Section 22 of the law on the SIS, the SIS director is empowered to lift the pledge only at the request of the criminal investigating bodies. I expect that the former SIS director will exercise his civic duty and initiate investigations into the alleged violations of the law on the SIS by some members of the special audit body.

Likewise, it will be necessary to reexamine whether any laws were violated by publishing information obtained by members of the special audit body during interviews with SIS members before the discussion of the general report on the SIS and its activity in the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

Esteemed deputies: I am convinced that the HZDS chairman has been and is playing the so-called intelligence game among constitutional representatives. I agree with the prime minister that such dirty tricks should not be taking place. I wish to assure you that I am not involved in such dirty tricks, nor will I ever sink to such a level. I am prepared to submit a more detailed stance to the prime minister's speech as soon as possible, as required by the situation. [end recording]

Poll on Public Attitudes Toward President Kovac

AU0604181195 Bratislava SME in Slovak 5 Apr 95 p 2

[SME report: "Most Citizens of Slovakia Are of the Opinion That Michal Kovac Is Trying To Be a Good President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In late March, the FOCUS agency carried out a representative survey of public opinion that also concerned the public's opinion of the president of the Slovak Republic. The data were collected between 21 and 27 March 1995. The sample of 830 respondents was representative of the adult population of Slovakia in terms of sex, age, level of education, size of community of residence, region, and nationality. All data are in percent.

Michal Kovac is trying to be a good president for all citizens:	
Definitely yes	26
Rather yes	44
Rather no	17
Definitely no	8
Do not know	5

The president overly succumbs to the influence of the opposition:

Definitely yes	11
Rather yes	25
Rather no	31
Definitely no	11
Do not know	22

By his activity, the president contributes to preserving and promoting democracy:

Definitely yes	22
Rather yes	44
Rather no	18
Definitely no	8
Do not know	8

By his activity, the president escalates conflicts and divides people:

Definitely yes	8
Rather yes	17
Rather no	35
Definitely no	30
Do not know	10

The president contributes to Slovakia's good image abroad:

Definitely yes	28
Rather yes	37
Rather no	18
Definitely no	6
Do not know	11

The president yields too much to pressure from the government coalition:

Definitely yes	7
Rather yes	21
Rather no	36
Definitely no	13
Do not know	23

Meciar on Withdrawal From Talks With IMF

LD0704082795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 0500 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Government will not raise the retirement age. Should the IMF insist on this, the Slovak Government will not hold talks with the IMF, Prime Minister Meciar said at a regular meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the citizens of Bratislava yesterday.

MSZOSZ Presents Alternative Economic Package

AU0604172495 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Apr 95 pp 1, 5

[Article by Erzsebet J. Kun: "MSZOSZ: Income Differences Are Too Big—The Trade Unions' Alternative Economic Package Is Here"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 4 April, after weeks of secrecy, the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] went public with its alternative package of proposals that are to counterbalance the 12 March government measures. In addition to professional aspects, the authors of the 25-page package, which will be submitted at today's session of the Interest Coordination Council, also took the views of civic organizations into consideration in their work. According to [MSZOSZ Chairman] Sandor Nagy, it is possible for the outlines of a social and economic agreement to again emerge, if the social partners are willing to compromise. Among other things, the MSZOSZ would restore the tax on interest, reduce income differences, and preserve the conditions of child rearing at the current level.

At his news conference, Nagy emphasized that it is not another 170-billion-forint package that they have created. The package of proposals places emphasis on such basic issues as establishing the conditions for economic upswing and growth. According to the trade unions, improvement of the current balance of payments and foreign trade balance, and incentives for better export performance, will have to be given priority. The document also states that no economic policy that does not deal with the reduction of unemployment can be successful. The MSZOSZ suggests that, in the future, the parliament discuss the employment policy guidelines each year.

According to the trade unions, launching fast and definite development in infrastructure and services—thus giving a boost to the development of quality tourism—is a condition of economic upturn. It is necessary to mobilize the tools of monetary policy to reduce the interest burdens, and a solution has to be found to handle the increasingly overwhelming debt burdens. The tax allowances that affect the revenue side of the budget will have to be reexamined. Tax on interest payments has to be restored—which would mean an extra budget revenue of 13 to 14.5 billion forints—and the reintroduction of minimum tax would result in extra revenue of 5 billion forints.

The package draws attention to the unreasonably big differences in incomes: Salaries and incomes that cannot be justified by performance exist in certain leading positions. The government sphere is one of the leaders, in this respect. The growth of incomes has to be limited, in this sphere, by reducing the basic salaries and linking, to a greater extent and on stricter conditions, the flexible part of the incomes to performance.

In connection with family allowance and child benefits, in the long run, the MSZOSZ considers a solution using the tax system acceptable.

Both versions of the package propose the benefits to be due as a citizen's right. However, in a given range, they accept for the benefits to be linked to a net income limit (20,000 forints). The trade union only considers it possible to merge or change the childcare fee and allowance, and the pregnancy and newborn child support, if the new system guarantees childcare on the current average level until the child's third year.

The MSZOSZ considers it unacceptable for sickness benefits not to be compulsory for the first five days of sick leave. It would help to reduce the inconsistencies of the sickness benefit system if the amount of sick leave that can be granted by the employer increased in such a way that less of a contribution would have to be paid to the amount of the increase in expenses. The employee who does not use sick leave could get the contribution. [last two sentences as published]

The MSZOSZ also formulated proposals on successfully curbing the black market economy. One such proposal is to establish a constitutional basis for asset declarations to facilitate the control of asset growth. However, this cannot serve the purpose of assets tax. The MSZOSZ does not approve of this. However, a one-off, progressively defined, assets tax above a certain level could be possible—or a voluntary contribution. According to the proposal, a minimum tax could be restored, and the tax on gambling should be increased. The MSZOSZ suggests that the budget support of various foundations be reassessed; the length or structure of the school year in public education be temporarily changed; and the budget and local-government support for machinery, office equipment, furniture, and car purchases and replacements, commercial televisions, daily newspapers, and magazines also be reassessed.

Official Views Relations With Middle East

AU0604172595 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Apr 95 p 11

[Article by "P.L." on interview with Zoltan Pereszlenyi, deputy state secretary at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry; place and date of interview not given: "Balanced Relations With the Arab Countries and Israel—Hungary Is Interested in Stability in the Region"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Ministry Deputy State Secretary Zoltan Pereszlenyi informed us about the efforts Hungarian diplomacy toward Middle East countries, our relations with the Arab countries and Israel, Hungarian President Arpad Goncz's recent tour of the region, and the "opening" of Saudi Arabia.

"Given the fact that the main directions of activity of Hungarian foreign policy aim at the Euro-Atlantic region, the economic potential of rapidly developing Asia and the southern shores of the Mediterranean

region that are geographically closer to us—and the Arab countries in general, including the Gulf area—represent a very important supplementary opportunity for the assertion of Hungarian economic and commercial interests. This group of countries is very important partly because of the importance of bilateral relations and partly because of their connection with Europe,” Pereszlenyi told us.

“We are mostly interested in developing economic relations with the Arab countries, and, naturally, this cannot be done without promoting other spheres of relations as well. I must mention here the historical traditions as well, because Hungary has had cultural contacts with the Arab countries for centuries. The school of oriental research developed in Hungary, a school boasting great traditions and results.

“In the sphere of bilateral relations, I would point out the economic and commercial interests. Several Arab countries have been traditional markets for various Hungarian goods since the 1930’s, and they continue to buy various types of Hungarian goods today. The region is also extremely important from the viewpoint of energy supply, because considerable imports arrive in Hungary from here. These imports can only increase in the future, because imports of mineral oil and oil products from the Middle East can counterbalance the former unilateral dependence on Soviet imports and Russian imports today. This is why Hungary participated in the construction of the Adria pipeline.

“The other major viewpoint is the connection of the Middle East region to peace and security in Europe and to economic development. Starting from this premise, we have a major interest in peace and stability in that region, and in a social and economic development that strengthens the European processes. I mean, here, primarily the security problems, environmental protection, and the issue of migration. In this respect, there are systematic contacts, such as the security policy cooperation between the OSCE and the Mediterranean region. The EU is also turning increasing attention to the region. Therefore, in addition to bilateral relations, Hungarian foreign policy was seeking opportunities of joining the various phases of the peace process in the Middle East. Thus, since 1994, Hungary has been present at the various multilateral forums of peace negotiations—namely in four working committees. Hungary too is interested in seeing the region reach the phase of peace and stability as soon as possible. As part of this, we support the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in this region, too, and these countries’ adherence to nuclear nonproliferation agreements. We can hardly envisage a stable peace and security in Europe without the elimination of conflicts in the Middle East. Hungary is interested in peace and stability, as well as economic development in the region; we are also interested in the weakening of negative trends connected to the appearance of various extremist forces, and also in seeing the processes in individual countries take the direction of democratic development.

“In the past eight years, since we renewed our diplomatic relations with Israel, we have been deliberately striving to maintain balanced relations with Israel and the Arab countries. As a result of the change in the regime in Hungary and getting rid of the ideological and other obligations forced upon us by a great power, a real opportunity emerged to build well-developing relations in both directions—namely, with the Arab countries and Israel—by focusing on Hungarian interests and starting from positions both principled and pragmatic positions. We do not have a separate foreign policy regarding Israel and regarding the Arab countries; instead, we simultaneously strive to develop our relations with both sides. Despite all its difficulties, the Middle East peace process justifies this attitude, because the relations between Israel and the Arab countries are getting increasingly stronger.

“Bilateral and international issues equally justify the continuation of various levels of dialogue with individual countries and groups of countries. The Hungarian president’s recent visit to the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait was part of this framework and system of relations. With this visit, we have now focused on a group of countries whose role will probably increase in the future. New elements have emerged, in addition to the economic and commercial relations and the traditional exchange of goods. These countries are also interested in investing in Hungarian economic development, in creating mixed enterprises, and in building tourism and banking-financial relations. This is the group of countries that has an adequate surplus of capital. We have had prosperous economic relations with Kuwait for a long time, but the recent presidential visit also promises to bring results in other areas.

“It was mentioned during the visit that Hungary is preparing to take up diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Among the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia was the only one that refrained from having diplomatic relations until quite recently. In August 1994, however, the Saudi information minister officially announced that his country wants to take up diplomatic relations with the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. Practically, we have only to carry out the technical tasks and we can exchange the relevant documents in New York in the near future. This will conclude the process of developing diplomatic relations with the Arab countries; and, because of its influence, economic potential, and great buying capability—as well as being a promising market for Hungarian goods and services—Saudi Arabia cannot be disregarded at all,” Zoltan Pereszlenyi pointed out.

Defense Minister on London Talks, U.S. Trip
LD0604211795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1630 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Levente Sukosd; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Sukosd] During your talks in London, how determined did you feel British support to be, in the matter of Hungary's joining NATO?

[Keleti] I felt it to be definitely determined from many points of view. The British defense minister also said that they support NATO's expansion and that they agree with the admittance of Hungary. Naturally, there has to be a process. I think that several standpoints have evolved within NATO on this issue. We did not talk about a timetable because this has to be a joint NATO decision. We talked, rather, about the forms of assistance and support with which the British Army, the British Armed Forces, can help the idea we formulate on joining NATO. [passage omitted]

[Sukosd] I presume you talked about the joint Hungarian-British military maneuvers. How important is this for the British?

[Keleti] They say it is very important. They will in fact also provide us with the form of assistance for which I asked during my visit: namely, that in the course of the preparations we be allowed to get acquainted with the so-called staff culture, the map symbols, the conventional map signs that in actual fact represent and serve cooperation between officers, so that Hungarian and British military officers will be able to understand each other on the training field. We are planning it for November. It will be a rather large-scale, so-called brigade staff-led, maneuver, in which support troops will also play a role. In other words, what the Hungarian, British, and German officers work out jointly, as a staff, will be put into actual practice by the soldiers in the field. This is, incidentally, one of the highest forms of cooperation between the armies of two countries, or three countries. [passage omitted]

In our opinion, the content of professional military work will be high. A guarantee for this is that the planning of the maneuver will take place according to NATO norms and methods.

[Sukosd] Next month you will be going to America. Will you be discussing similar topics there as well?

[Keleti] Similar topics will be discussed in the United States as well. Naturally, the dimensions are different. However, I think that much more important will be that, in the United States, there will be the signing or the immediate preparation of an agreement on the protection of secrets—because this means that Hungary, perhaps in the development of its military technology, counts on American entrepreneurs, or arms-manufacturers, as well.

[Sukosd] I imagine that this might, so to speak, annoy Russia, for example. In your opinion, how dangerous is this?

[Keleti] What I consider dangerous is not the opinions but the fact that Russian opinion is capable of changing in this rapid and fairly fundamental manner—because I

would like to remind you that when Prime Minister Gyula Horn talked with President Yeltsin, Yeltsin reassured the Hungarian delegation that they consider our joining NATO to be an issue belonging to an entirely sovereign sphere of decisions and do not wish to interfere in this matter, since Hungary's joining NATO does not threaten Russia's security. If certain military leaders, or those engaged in foreign policy, now formulate an opinion that is the opposite of this, I see the danger to lie in that—because it would be a completely new kind of thing in a country's politics if, following the official discussions, entirely different opinions emerge.

[Sukosd] How do you see this, as a politician? What lies behind it? Tactics or a lack of coordination?

[Keleti] The way I see it is that Russia's various opinion makers say different things in different countries. This is not a good thing. I am very confident that in the near future there will be a meeting with the Russian defense minister, a meeting that has already been postponed three times because of the Chechen issue. The process of a domestic political conflict prevented the Russian minister from coming to Budapest. This meeting, where I hope we shall be able to discuss this issue as well will—I think—be able, in a certain respect, to put a full stop to this polemic, which you too have raised.

Keleti Offers Facilities for British Exercises

AU0604204295 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 6 Apr 95 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Eva Elekes in London on 5 April: "The Bakony Expects British Soldiers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *British troops will hold exercises in Hungary if the Hungarian and British defense ministries manage to agree on the conditions of cooperation, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti said before his departure at the end of his three-day visit to Britain.*

[Keleti] During my visit it was published in the British press that their defense ministry is seeking East European training fields and they believe it possible to hold exercises in the Czech Republic or Poland. Few training fields exist in Great Britain; at the same time, large numbers of British troops are returning from the continent. During my official talks, I suggested that Hungarian training fields could also be considered. We agreed that a delegation would come to Hungary to look at the training fields and to discuss what kind of exercises they have in mind. As a matter of fact, Brits participated in a Hungarian exercise last year. They are familiar with the conditions at Hungarian training fields, and they had a very good opinion of them.

[Elekes] Why can it be in Hungary's interest to allow other armies to use our training fields?

[Keleti] This would be a new form of cooperation. Naturally, a country never allows the use of its training

fields on a "charity" basis, free of charge. The costs are always paid for. For example, a British company could spend two months in Hungary. This would not necessarily mean shooting exercises. The practical part of military training would be done here, and they would exercise the various tactical maneuvers.

[Elekes] Will environmental concerns emerge?

[Keleti] Hungarian training fields are located in places that are unsuitable for agriculture. At the same time, because of budget considerations, the Hungarian Army's exercises are rather restrained as regards their number

and size. Some of our training fields are underused. Therefore, we are not planning to allow any tasks here that could not be performed in Britain because of the strong objections of environmentalists. We do not want to import environmental hazards. We will assess the British needs, and then we will of course also consult with the local governments.

[Elekes] Which training fields could be considered?

[Keleti] The area near Varpalota. Actually, we have a huge training field along Bakony Hill, starting at Veszprem, that would be suitable for this task.

Presidential Candidate Kuron in Hospital

LD0604201195 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish
1730 GMT 6 Apr 95

[From the "Wiadomosci" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jacek Kuron, Freedom Union [UW] presidential candidate, is in the hospital in Olsztyn. Kuron fell off a bicycle at the government rest and recreation center in Lansk. Doctors at the hospital where the presidential candidate was admitted report that they are conducting a series of tests. The duty doctor refused to give this program any detailed information.

Justice Minister on Review of Kuklinski Case

LD0604130695 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program
Network in Polish 1105 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia has admitted that the extraordinary review of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski's case came as a surprise to him, but he has given assurances that the case will be examined by the Supreme Court solely on a legal basis, without any political or ideological context. The justice minister emphasized that the extraordinary review of Kuklinski's case should not be a factor in the presidential campaign.

[Begin Jaskiernia recording] The extraordinary review can occur in a situation where there are legal reasons justifying such a review, particularly if there has been an error in the trial procedure. Consequently, the fundamental matter to be decided by the Supreme Court will be to establish whether there are any new legal reasons that would justify the commencement of the extraordinary review proceedings and a positive response to the motion requesting an extraordinary review.

This is a very serious matter. It should be decided in accordance with what transpires from the documentation. It seems to me that it would not be a good thing that such a serious legal issue, legal and international issue because it also concerns our bilateral relations with the United States, should be used as a factor in a political and presidential campaign. [end recording]

Oleksy Briefs Local Media on Cabinet Agenda

MM0604133295 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in
Polish 31 Mar 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Pawel Winiarski: "The Might of the Regional Press: Government Work Agenda—New Tax Law—Reform of Social Insurance System—Zloty To Be Revalued: Our Correspondent Reports on Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy's Meeting With Regional Media Journalists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I am well aware that regional newspapers provide an essential source of information and influence the opinion of large circles of the reading public," Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy said at the Council of Ministers' Office yesterday during a meeting with

journalists from regional press, radio, and television. "We would like to work out the best ways in which to conduct cooperation between the government information agencies and the regional newspapers, broadcasting stations, and television centers, so they can all carry fast and reliable information about the government's activities, its current agenda, and the effects of its work. It was with these concerns in mind that we have prepared a special document entitled 'Government Work Agenda,' which covers the whole of the current year. We want it to be a source of information on the scope, the timetable, and the manner of our operations. In addition, we plan to set up a new information center for the media."

Although the prime minister had indicated that he was first and foremost interested in hearing his audience's comments and recommendations concerning government information policy, the meeting soon developed into a regular press conference. And that was probably for the best because the prime minister allowed the assembled journalists a glimpse of the next few moves on his Cabinet's agenda. In the next few weeks, the Council of Ministers will turn its attention to the recently completed bill on the new tax law. This document could prove to be of fundamental importance for smaller and bigger investors alike, Polish as well as foreign. It is expected to provide essential information on the tax system, the loans system, and the precise schemes for tax allowances and concessions for the next few years!

"It is a most important document," Prime Minister Oleksy said. "This is because we currently note a most dangerous phenomenon whereby foreign investment growth trends have leveled off and capital is actually draining away. The new tax law could alter this situation radically. But it is too early to discuss the details because the Council of Ministers has not made any announcements on this matter."

Nor did the prime minister disclose any details about the reform of the social insurance system that is currently in preparation. The Council of Ministers is to debate this issue in two weeks' time. Apparently some very important changes are being considered. The question of the devaluation of the zloty is also shrouded in deep secrecy. The prime minister conceded that talks and consultations on this matter are under way, but he would give no details.

Asked to comment on foreign investment in the Polish printing industry and newspapers sector, Jozef Oleksy said that he is in favor of freedom of action for investors. Every method of attracting foreign capital is good if it is effective. But the prime minister added that he is also in favor of defining the terms and the share of foreign capital's participation in this sector. For the time being, however, no legislative initiatives have been submitted in this respect.

The prime minister also reported on the work aimed at the establishment of an economic center to replace the present sector-based system of government portfolios

and the establishment in the near future of a new ministry for integration into the EU. "Of course we are constantly accelerating the processes connected with the planned activation of the National Investment Funds [NFI]. Plans are already in existence to create new NFI's. Apart from that, the process of commercialization of selected state enterprises, which, for a variety of reasons, cannot take part in the Universal Privatization Program, is to be launched any time now," Jozef Oleksy added.

GLOS SZCZECINSKI also managed to put a couple of questions to the prime minister. Unfortunately, we received no reply to either one. The questions concerned the future of Euroregions in the present circumstances, considering that the European border barriers now seem to be closing to keep us out, and also the government program drawn up for the maritime economy. Perhaps in a few days, once we have received replies from the Government Press Office, we will be able to tell whether the process of deregistering ships by Polish shipping companies will be halted, whether shipowners will soon be able to purchase cheaper fuel in Poland, and whether the situation of our deep-sea fishing enterprises in the Sea of Okhotsk will finally be regulated. So we will soon find out whether Prime Minister Oleksy's government has any specific answers to these questions.

Police Recover Stolen Radioactive Isotopes

LD0604140595 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1100 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The police and civil defense services have recovered the four containers with Americium isotope and one with Cesium isotope that were stolen in Wroclaw yesterday [5 April]. The police are aware of the whereabouts of the last of the stolen containers with radioactive material. The theft was committed by four 12-year old pupils from a Wroclaw primary school.

Developments After Tribunal Ruling on KRRiT

LD0604215295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1730 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidential Chancellery does not see any possibility of restoring to Marek Markiewicz the post of chairman of the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council [KRRiT], despite the

ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal yesterday on the basis of which it transpires that the president did not have the right to recall Markiewicz.

The presidential Chancellery acknowledges the ruling of the Tribunal but feels that the law on radio and television broadcasting gives no opportunity for the return of Marek Markiewicz, who is no longer a member of the KRRiT, to the post of chairman.

[Begin Andrzej Gliniecki, member of the presidential Chancellery recording] In this situation, it is not appropriate to expect a change in the stance of the president because this cannot take place in accordance with the regulations that are in force. [end recording]

The plenipotentiary of the Polonia 1 television network of Nicola Grausso, Robert Smoktunowicz, feels that the broadcasting concessions signed by Markiewicz's successors are invalid, just like Markiewicz's recall from the post of chairman. Polonia 1 had already made an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court against the concession for the Kanal-Plus station, questioning the clarity of its capital composition. Polonia 1 will not make a new complaint but wishes to prove before the courts that the concession for Canal-Plus signed by [KRRiT chairman] Janusz Zaorski is invalid.

KRRiT experts feel that, although the Constitutional Tribunal acknowledged the recall of Markiewicz as illegal, the decisions of his successors are legal, including those of the present chairman, Janusz Zaorski, who was appointed by the president last year.

[Begin Professor Stanislaw Piatek recording] Until the legality of this appointment is questioned, on the basis of an appropriate procedure, all of his activities are legally binding. And this procedure on the basis of which this appointment could be questioned does also, in essence, not exist. [end recording]

Because the appointment of the chairman of the KRRiT is not, just like the appointment of a minister, an administrative decision, and it is not subject to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court.

The Senate elected Witold Grabos of the Democratic Left Alliance to the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council. There were 60 senators voting for his election and 22 against. Grabos will replace Jan Szafraniec in the KRRiT.

Izetbegovic: 'We Will Not Extend Cease-Fire'

BR0704143295 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 7 Apr 95
p 12

[Unattributed article: "Izetbegovic: We Will Not Extend the Cease-Fire"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, speaking in the first interview ever given simultaneously to seven newspapers in the World Media organization over the Internet, said: "We have not yet decided, but my personal opinion is that we will not extend the cease-fire which is due to expire on 30 April 1995." This "conversation" was made possible thanks to the "Sarajevo Live, Sarajevo On-Line" campaign.

Izetbegovic said that his government has not planned any offensive action but pointed out that "the formal acceptance of an extension of the cease-fire would inevitably lead to the permanent occupation of 70 percent of our territory."

The Bosnian chief admitted he had reached the conclusion some time ago that nobody would come to his aid. "We must defend ourselves. If we had not taken to arms we would have been destroyed as a state and as a people." Izetbegovic repeated the criticisms that the Sarajevo government usually levels at the United Nations: "The UN forces are maintaining the status quo on all sides. Therefore the people do not want them. We are not asking for the UN mandate to be changed but for their forces to apply it to the letter in accordance with the Security Council resolutions."

The interviewers asked Izetbegovic where the Armija's (the primarily Muslim Bosnian Army's) weapons had come from. He replied: "We get our weapons from three sources. First, and most importantly, there are the weapons we capture from the enemy; then there are those that we produce in our factories; finally there are the weapons that we buy from other countries. On this last point, we do not criticize anyone nor do we feel guilty about anything—we have the right to defend a state and a people who have been attacked."

"Are you in favor of mutual diplomatic recognition by Bosnia and Serbia?" the journalists of World Media asked. He replied: "Serbia's recognition of Bosnia would be important because it would affect the course of the war. Therefore I am ready to go to Belgrade in person to obtain this recognition." The Bosnian president stressed the different personal interests that, to his mind, Bosnian-Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic are defending: "Karadzic does not see his personal future tied to Milosevic. That does not mean that Milosevic has given up his plans for a Greater Serbia but rather that Karadzic no longer figures in these plans." [passage omitted]

Silajdzic Denies Knowledge of Bonn Negotiations

AU0704140795 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in
Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Apr 95 p 4

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Mirjana Micevska; place and date not given: "I Did Not Know About Bonn Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The Republic's Assembly at its latest session debated and supported the Bonn agreement. The document will be discussed at the announced session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation. However, the discussion so far has raised several questions and raised some dilemmas. The thing that took the public by surprise was that the prime minister had not attended the talks on the agreement, particularly as the document devotes a lot of attention to relations between the Republic and Federal Governments. We have been speaking about this and other issues connected to the functioning of the Federation with Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, who said:*

[Silajdzic] I can tell you straight away that I did not know that these negotiations were going to be held. I found out about the talks on the very day they were being held. I cannot explain this to you, I can only tell you why I was not at the talks. I simply did not know that they were going to take place.

Not Everything Is Logical

[Micevska] Was it logical for you, as prime minister of the government under discussion, to have attended the Bonn talks?

[Silajdzic] It would have been completely logical, but as you know, not everything is done according to logic.

[Micevska] According to the official interpretation of the agreement, the personnel of the Republic and the Federal Government should be separated. What does that mean from the point of view of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] There is some mention of that in the agreement. However, I have already stressed that federal law stipulates that the Republic Government is to carry out the duties of the Federal Government with the same personnel until the final peace solution.

[Micevska] What is the meaning of the Bonn agreement, considering your statement that it is in fact an agreement on the already agreed?

[Silajdzic] There are things which we have already agreed, and that is that. If we are going to hold meetings under German auspices, then we should talk about things on which we have not already agreed. As far as the government is concerned, we have agreed about certain things and we should not bring them up again unless someone does not like them. The things that we have not agreed on and should be a unified energy system, customs, police, and the treasury. Everything that we agreed on in Washington appears again in the Bonn

Agreement. I would simply like us to start agreeing on things that we have not already agreed on.

[Micevska] Do you think there is sufficient political will for an agreement?

[Silajdzic] The Federation would have been established a long time ago had there been sufficient political will. There is none and that is the problem. For example, I can tell you that we are currently working on getting in the fertilizers that are necessary for sowing, for survival. There are 70 trucks waiting. We absolutely need it, but they are held up at the border. Why? These are the things that we have to solve.

[Micevska] Accusations were exchanged at the Assembly session. Minister Grabovac said that goods from Herceg-Bosna were being taxed on the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

There Were No Accusations

[Silajdzic] I will not comment on what Mr. Grabovac said. I would like to say that accusations were not exchanged.

It seems to me that the result of the Bonn agreement is to be the annulment of everything that some people did not want to implement, so as no guilty party is found for things that have not been done over this last year. So new dates are set and so we go on endlessly.

It is not true that accusations were exchanged, because had they been exchanged, there would have been a very long list of things that the Croatian side primarily has failed to do. That is perfectly clear to everyone. Had we allowed the arbiter to do his job, he would have achieved the same result that Koschnick [EU administrator] reached in Mostar.

[Micevska] The Bonn agreement is the first document that implies the political responsibility of its signatories. What do you think might happen if it is not implemented by the end of April, when a revision of the results is expected to be carried out?

[Silajdzic] I am not interested in political responsibility. What does it mean, anyway? It cannot be reduced to only two men. I am interested in constitutional and legal responsibility. We are not starting from scratch every time. We have the Constitution, we have the relevant authorities and responsibilities. What political responsibility? I do not know what that is since we are all politically responsible. [passage omitted]

Izetbegovic on Bonn Agreement

AU0704143795 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 3 Apr 95 p 2

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Results are Important and They Are Good"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview with Saturday's edition of VECERNJE NOVINE, Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic expressed certain reservations concerning the recently signed Bonn agreement, which had been approved by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly and Presidency a few days earlier. The prime minister's main objection was that he had no knowledge of the Bonn agreement.

Since Silajdzic's statement could cause some confusion among the public, VECERNJE NOVINE has asked President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency to comment on this.

[Izetbegovic] There is a fine Chinese proverb that says: It does not matter whether the cat is black or white, what matters is that it catches mice. I want to say that it does not matter whether something is done by Haris or Ejup [Ganic], what matters is the result. And in my view the result in this case is good. The Bonn agreement is a kind of an operational plan for things that have been agreed earlier, an attempt to set precise details and deadlines in order to single out the side that is obstructing the agreement. The Bonn agreement involves Germany in this, which is a good move. Even after this things might not go well, but this will not be because of the Bonn agreement but for other reasons that are known all too well. The Bonn agreement is trying to find a cure for this situation. We know that some extremist forces in the so-called Herceg-Bosna do not like this agreement, so they have canceled the already scheduled session of the Constituent Assembly. They did this when they heard that we would accept the agreement. Why should we help them obstruct anything?

[VECERNJE NOVINE] What can be expected then?

[Izetbegovic] I think that our benevolent persistence will win and that we will finally move forward. We should know more about this in a couple of days.

Abdic Says Western Bosnia 'Key' to Crisis

LD0604114495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1052 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Velika Kladusa, 6 Apr (TANJUG)—Western Bosnia is the key to a solution for the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fikret Abdic, president of Western Bosnia, told TANJUG.

According to Abdic, the [Bosnian] Serb republic, the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, Western Bosnia, and the rest of Bosnia should search for a solution to the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"We believe that the Serb republic, Herceg-Bosna, and Western Bosnia will find common ground easily, and Western Bosnia should seek a solution with 'the rest of Bosnia.'

"This is why it is important that Western Bosnia should have the constitutional and legal form of a republic, rather than a province, because the word province would

point toward links with Alija's [Izetbegovic's] authorities, which no longer exist since Western Bosnia solves its problems completely independently," Abdic stressed.

"We spent a long time explaining our idea and our option, then we spent a long time defending it with arms, but since 16 November we have been at war, so we cannot hold talks as we used to before," Abdic stressed.

Abdic expects the international community to recognize the situation on the ground and recognize Western Bosnia as an important player in the negotiations, because "we have been fighting for 20 months now and it is obvious that we were right."

Karadzic: No UNPROFOR Changes Accepted

LD0704145995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1412 GMT 7 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 Apr (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb republic, said at a news conference in Pale today that the Serb republic would not accept any change in UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] mandate in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and would not agree to the control [kontrola] of the border with the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK].

Karadzic announced that the assemblies of the Serb republic and the RSK would consider a plan for a federation between these two Serb states, as a response to pressure from the international community.

Describing the arrival of NATO troops in former Croatia to help with a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR as "NATO's entrance into the Balkan region through the back door," the president of the Serb republic warned that the presence of the NATO forces did not contribute to peace.

"NATO forces work in our enemies' interest, which we will not tolerate," Karadzic said and told the journalists that the Serb army had recently been forced to bring down two NATO planes flying over Tuzla and Bihac in a reconnaissance mission on behalf of the enemies of the Serbs.

Speaking about the Muslim offensive on Mounts Majevica and Vlasic, President Karadzic confirmed that it has been crushed and that the Muslim units were suffering huge losses in manpower and equipment, and repeated that the Muslims were the first to violate the agreement on the four-month cessation of hostilities.

Serbs Target Sarajevo From Exclusion Zone

AU0604155895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1300 GMT

on 6 April carries in its regular 48-minute newscast several reports on the widespread fighting in the republic.

Studio announcer Amra Durakovic cites a report by the 2d Corps Information Service that "the 2d Corps troops are valiantly and successfully defending the newly achieved positions on the Mt. Majevica front. This morning alone, our troops destroyed an anti-aircraft gun in the region of Androvici and a self-propelled weapon [samohodka] and its entire crew in the region of Ravne Njive. A whole unit of aggressor troops was also liquidated at [name indistinct]." She goes on to say that the aggressor is attacking civilian targets. "Tank and howitzer shells were fired at Kalesija, Jajce, Medjasi, and Celic." There is no peace on the Gracanica front either. From the direction of Doboj and Ciganiste, the aggressor attacked targets in Lukavica, Rijeka, and the UN Protection Force observation post in the area, at which they fired two 155-mm howitzer shells. Durakovic says that "intelligence sources report that the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor is bringing captured Bosniaks from the camp at Batkovici to dig trenches on the Mt. Majevica front, or is using them as a live shield during infantry assaults."

Studio announcer Durakovic then introduces a report by Bihac correspondent Muhamed Mulic. Mulic reports that "the fiercest battles are being waged along the Velika Kladusa-Vrnograc line. Following fierce artillery preparations, the enemy forces launched infantry assaults, but the B-H Army defenders repelled the attacks and pushed the aggressors back to their initial positions. Other parts of this flaming front also came under enemy shelling. There has been no peace in the Bihac safe zone. The aggressor has since this morning fired several shells at the defense lines and Bihac outskirts, while the villages of Veliki Skocaj, Medjudrazje, and Sokolac and the defense on Mt. Pjesivica have been exposed to particularly fierce shelling. Frequent provocations from all types of weaponry have been reported on fronts around Bosanska Krupa, the Grmusa-Srbijani Plateau, and the Grabez Heights."

Back in the studio, Durkaovic cites a report by the 1st Corps Information Service and says that "launching a sudden artillery attack at Hrasnica, the aggressor today killed a child and a woman, while several civilians were wounded. The latest crime occurred when sometime after noon Hrasnica was suddenly pounded by 120-mm mortar bombs. The heinous attack was carried out from the region of Lukavica—that is, the exclusion zone." She goes on to say that "the same source reports snipers again active. They opened fire from the Jewish Cemetery at Marijin Dvor, while from Gornje Borije and Cavrkova Stijena they targeted Gazivode and Vasin Han. Moreover, the aggressor from his positions in Adzici fired portable rocket launcher shells at the city's defense."

Party Chairmen View New UN Resolution

AU0704104095 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Apr 95 p 4

[Article by S. Lukic, V. Vukovic, and V. Gotal on statements by ASH Chairman Mika Tripalo, HKDU Chairman Marko Veselica, HSS Chairman Zlatko Tomcic, and Croatian Forum Chairman Zeljko Olujic on the latest UN Security Council resolution; place and date not given: "The Accent on—Implementation!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Miko Tripalo, chairman of the Action of Social Democrats of Croatia, ASH] I have not yet seen the whole text of the resolution, but on the basis of the information on it, I can say that several Croatian requirements have been fulfilled by its adoption.

First, the title of the peacekeeping mission contains the name Croatia, and the presence of international forces along the Croatian borders has been specified, too. What has remained unclear to me, and will perhaps become clear when the integral text of the resolution has been published, is the question on how the international forces are going to supervise [nadzirati] the two existing agreements—the cease-fire agreement and the agreement on economic cooperation—and how they will be included in further negotiations between the parties to the conflict in Croatia.

An open question is whether the resolution foresees the presence of international forces along the present demarcation lines or not. It can in any way be considered a success that Croatia has again been declaratively recognized within its international borders, and the tendency to solve the problem of occupied areas within the Croatian state is obvious.

Everything is still at the level of declaration though. How the resolution's stipulations will be implemented remains to be seen. Implementation mechanisms might be more clearly defined by a new UN Security Council resolution and a UN secretary general report, which is scheduled for the end of April.

[Marko Veselica, chairman of the Croatian Christian Democratic Union, HKDU] UN Security Council Resolution No. 981 is the best one adopted so far. It is especially important that it is geographically limited exclusively to Croatian territory and that the title of the mission contains the name Croatia. This will considerably reduce the free play of the rebel Serbs, but it will also show their European allies that their time of doing whatever they want is over.

Here are the main points from the statement by Marko Veselica at a Croatian Christian Democratic Union Senate meeting on 1 April. The HKDU chairman pointed out, however, that the Croatian leadership must now pay special attention to the mechanisms for implementing the resolution, where the most important thing is to disarm the rebel Serbs and establish the Croatian police in occupied territories, which will also enable the refugees to return home.

"Regarding the importance of the situation in which Croatia is now I think that it is necessary to convene the Croatian Parliament as soon as possible in order to make it possible for the representatives to tell their opinion about the resolution," Veselica said.

[Zlatko Tomcic, chairman of the Croatian Peasants' Party, HSS] Croatia required the fulfillment of three basic conditions that should have been part of Resolution No. 981: The Croatian name should have been part of the new mandate title, it should have been clearly stated that the UN Protection Force mandate expired on 31 March, and an adequate control [kontrola] of the Croatian internationally recognized borders toward Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina should have been defined.

As far as the first condition is concerned, UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] reminds me of the Russian version of the name that was planted on us [not further specified]. As far as the expiry of the UN Protection Force mandate is concerned, I think it has been correctly defined by the resolution, but the control of the Croatian borders is controversial and too broadly defined. It leaves too much space for further speculations what "the international control of borders" means. Everything in Butrus-Ghali's report less than full control and the prevention of the military units and equipment transport will be below the Croatian requirement.

I think that a serious drawback is also the fact that the demilitarization and the return of the refugees have been defined in such a way that their implementation will necessitate the approval by both sides. This stipulation implies that the rebel Serbs have an equal position in the search for a solution to legal issues [as Croatia], which is opposed by the HSS.

I think that the resolution in any case satisfied certain Croatian requirements, but it is not enough clear and precise, however. "It was obviously left to Butrus-Ghali to define the implementation mechanism in his report due on 22 April, but since he is not fond of Croatia and rather supports the Serbian side, we are not too optimistic."

[Zeljko Olujic, chairman of the Croatian Forum] My first reaction refers to the UNCRO name because Croatia is not mentioned in it, these letters are a pure coincidence. In other words, the requirement to mention the Croatian name was not adopted. Second, Butrus-Ghali's report will be respected, which is a slap for Croatia. Third, it is constantly repeated that a solution to the former Yugoslavia must be found, and there is no state with the name of the former Yugoslavia. There is only the Republic of Croatia. Fourth, the Croatian Government and the authorities of the rebel Serbs as permanently mentioned as equal partners and equally responsible factors, whereas the guilt and the Croatian right to establish law and order are not at all mentioned. Fifth, it has not been mentioned that any kind of

sanctions will be introduced against the rebel Serbs. This is all, and therefore I would like to propose that this resolution be rejected and a new Croatian proposal made.

Commentary on Resolution

AU0704104395 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 3
Apr 95 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "Croatia Sentenced to Peaceful Reintegration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a time when it can actually boast of great diplomatic and political success, Croatia once more faces new uncertain deadlines and continues to hover between the earth and the sky. Under a cold mathematical analysis, the latest UN Security Council resolution turns out to be a formula with too many unknowns, so that those Italian journalists who instantly called it an "empty box" were not exaggerating with their nonchalant cynicism. Over the next three weeks, Butrus Butrus-Ghali and the divergent international decision-makers must at least partially fill that "empty box" with "something" or "someone." All that has happened so far in the tense political battles does not offer too much hope that in this forced additional test they will prove very resolute or zealous. Croatian diplomacy must constantly catch fresh breath for ever new races, even when it has already started breathing through gills.

But even that "empty box" brings much more than Croatia had previously been granted in New York, since now for the first time its disputed quarter has been firmly glued onto it and, in principle, it has even been agreed for it to be additionally secured—with a tight lid, at least. Thus, with a little decorous optimism, it can openly be said that with this resolution Croatia has for the first time been recognized in its full and proper size, its total extent, and its whole dimensions. It still has to walk with the help of crutches, but now at least fears have been dispelled that its festering foot might be amputated. The international community has decided to treat this inflammation further so that it does not spread to the whole neighborhood.

In general, Mate Granic is right when he states that this is "the strongest political document that the Security Council has ever passed in favor of Croatia," although some additional statements by officials tend to revert to the old tendency toward self-deception. Indeed, the unquestionable confirmation of Croatia's integrity has for the time being remained wishful thinking on paper, just as the UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones have only been abolished on paper. Belgrade has lost the right to have its signature on this, but much will still depend on its covert or overt wishes. Croatia has succeeded in fighting for its own name, but Butrus-Ghali's bureaucracy has also succeeded in defending its political and military unity in commanding and administering all the fronts on the territory of "former Yugoslavia." Letters from Knin have been reduced to private mail, but they

are still being read with dangerous respect, and nobody knows as yet what the "help" in supervising [nadgledavanje] Croatia's international borders will boil down to.

Some new obligations, such as concluding the contract on peacekeeping forces with the bureaucracy in New York, will impose even more responsibility on Croatia and, in those parts of the Resolution that relate to the "demilitarization of Prevlaka" or to the undisturbed work of UN radio and television stations, even more is required from Zagreb than from Knin. Do the media always have to be a stumbling block? The mention of Croatia's name has hardly been noticed as a political guideline, whereas from the very beginning much has been said about "confidence restoration," as though it were a matter of a neighborhood quarrel, not the appropriation of land, for which someone, some day, will have to stand trial. Even Croatia's best friends, such as the Americans, refer to the continued presence of international troops as a way to open a possibility of talks about "mutual differences," but they do not say whether the restored supervision [nadzor] will "boost or weaken that possibility." That depends on both sides, since "a solution can be imposed neither by the Security Council nor by the world powers."

So what is it that is nevertheless being imposed? Knin, naturally, cannot stomach being finally fenced into Croatia and, as for Croatia, what has been imposed upon it is the type of policy. It has been sentenced to "peaceful reintegration," under a new compromise that has already been concocted in international laboratories. Therefore it would be fatal if it is thought that this written confirmation of Croatia's first and family name was also a green light for the use of "all other means." Although it was not explicitly stated in the Resolution, the whole document again boils down to a bilateral "imposition of peace", for which Zagreb is being required to offer much more and Knin only to agree to the basics.

Croatia was supported, among other things, in order not to give way to some dangerous temptations. This may be the basic point on which the disunited five powers agreed, with even Moscow being made to acknowledge Croatia's demands, so that Zagreb does not feel obliged to bash its head against the wall. If there is a moral to be seen in all this, then it boils down to the bitter observation that this Resolution does not guarantee that Croatia's friends will not change their attitude if Zagreb changes its mood again. The period of aimless wandering around is generally over, but nobody knows how long the road ahead is.

Copenhagen Agreement Seen as Capitulation

95BA0205A Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 15
Mar 95 p 18

[Article by Zdravko Mrcic: "Even Josip Broz Did Not Allow Such Concessions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The public was informed last week that Croatia has consented to keep UN forces on its

soil. Political observers have been expecting such a move not only in recent days, but ever since the day when Dr. Tudjman announced to Croatian schoolchildren that a decision decisive for Croatia had been taken.

The so-called decision to expel the UN forces was not aimed at departure of the UN forces, but at boosting temporarily the slumping prestige of Croatian ruling circles with their own voters. When I said after the rejection of the UN forces that the fear of war flaring up was exaggerated, I was thinking that Croatia was not capable of sticking with crucial decisions because of the way in which it is being governed. Political deceptions of Croatian voters are nothing new. Last spring, after the first split in the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], Dr. Tudjman announced the campaign against the "krajina" in a speech in Podgora so as to homogenize his own party and hold on to the voters he had had up to that point, and in that he was successful. This time the stakes were higher.

Government propagandists are talking now about the international "presence" in Croatia, which will: (1) oversee a section of the Croatian border inaccessible to Croatian forces, (2) oversee the access and communications of international organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina in regions of Croatia that are inaccessible to Croatian forces, and (3) make it possible to continue application of the two agreements reached up to now with the Knin authorities. Unofficial statements by government propagandists indicate a reduction in the number of UN soldiers in Croatia.

Zagreb Weakened

However, it is to be hoped that the Croatian public, politicians, business people, the workers, and displaced persons will understand that the Croatian leadership has once again given in to the Serbs and international interests that condone Serbian aggression, that it omitted to take at least a small political step in the direction of liberating the occupied areas, and that it has drastically weakened the position of Zagreb vis-a-vis Knin. Why has Zagreb's position vis-a-vis Knin been weakened irrevocably?

The mandate of the UN forces has up to now been based on the so-called Vance Plan, which envisaged withdrawal of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] from Croatia, withdrawal of heavy weapons from the UNPA's [UN Protected Areas] and their demilitarization, establishment of ethnically mixed Croatian-Serbian police forces, and the return of displaced persons. The Serbs have prevented implementation of the Vance Plan, they have ethnically cleansed the occupied areas, and they have established a state recognized by Serbia and the Srpska republic and protected by the United Nations, the "international community," and indeed even by Croatia's greatest allies, such as the United States and Germany.

Ending the present mandate of the UN forces based on the Vance Plan signifies that Croatia is consciously

withdrawing from the Vance Plan. That this is not a mere question of a principle can be concluded from the fact that commencing on 1 April there will be no legal basis for disarming the "rebellious" Serbs. As of 1 April of this year, the Serbs will be armed legally, because by consent of Dr. Tudjman in Copenhagen the UN forces do not have the right to oversee what up to now have been the UNPA's. Their future task is to oversee part of the Croatian borders and traffic across them, just as the Croatian police oversee Serbian traffic, say, in Dragalic. Now there actually are no UNPA's. It is really a question of Krajina, a name that even the government propagandists need not put in quotes.

Russian Troops to the Borders of Croatia

Surveillance of borders, judging by the course of negotiations with the international community up to this point, envisages "monitoring the international border between the Republic of Croatia [RH] and the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and between the RH and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at those places where the main border crossings are not now under the oversight of authorities of the RH." The formulation is worded precisely in order to conceal the Croatian capitulation from illiterate people and to offer activists of the party of the ruling circles words that will fill the vacuum created by the astonishment of ordinary Croats following the turncoat performance in Copenhagen. The agreement does not mention oversight of secondary crossings, which could become the main ones in a moment. The Croatian voters have completely lost confidence in any kind of international surveillance, because the United Nations has discredited itself with its actions all over the world. We can assume that even Russian troops within the UN forces will come to Croatian borders. Even Josip Broz did not allow such concessions. However, the "international presence" on the borders between the RH and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina precludes the possibility of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] doing part of the job of reintegrating the occupied areas of Croatia thanks to good deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Krajina Serbs are now safe: Not only will Croatian forces not attack them directly from Croatia, but neither will they be attacked from Bosnia-Herzegovina by joint forces of Croats and Bosnian Muslims, although the Serbs are abundantly attacking Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatia. Why not station UN forces at Grahovo?

The agreements with Krajina on separation of forces (29 March 1994) and on economic matters (2 December 1994) show that modification of the mandate of the UN forces is not a step of its own that the Croatian authority undertook itself, but that this is an intentional weakening of the Croatian position to the point where it will "have to" accept the "Z-4 plan." Those agreements facilitated withdrawal of Krajina forces from the "line of separation" and their concentration on Bihać and their unrestricted supply from Serbia and Russia along the limited-access highway. Now Krajina does not even need

the Bosnian "corridor" because Croatia has opened the limited-access highway to them.

The West Wants the Status Quo

The fact that the day after they received the glad news that the United Nations would remain the Serbs began attacks against Croatian units near Grahovo and on Gradacac is evidence that the position of Zagreb vis-a-vis Knin would be stronger without any UN forces in Croatia. The small UN forces will be a humiliating reminder to Croatia that it consented to its own humiliation.

What hurts Croatia most is that Croatian authorities are voluntarily consenting to the new mandate of UN forces. Now the authorities cannot make an excuse to the voters as they did after acceptance of the Vance Plan, saying that the plan's acceptance prevented "further devastation of Croatian cities." The position of Knin and the "krajina" will be determined by the free political will of Zagreb.

By consenting to UN forces remaining in Croatia, Croatian authorities have renounced the deceitful idea of first resolving the "Croatian crisis," and then Croatia, strengthened and once again united, would take a constructive and peaceful approach to resolving the Bosnian crisis. The sequence of tasks has now changed, and it is likely that the solution of the Bosnian crisis will also establish the model for resolving the problem that came about with the Serbian rebellion in Croatia. Let the deputies and the public recall the speeches about the priorities of Croatian policy that the foreign minister has recently delivered in the Croatian parliament.

The Western powers, which are shying away from facing the real problem of Russia, feel that the continuing presence of UN forces until October 1995 will prevent Croatian forces from taking military action until the spring of 1996. That offers them breathing room of 12 months, and all the West wants now is to maintain the status quo.

The Joy of Butrus-Ghali and Babic

We need not even mention that there is no mention of the role of the parliament in conceding the "international presence" in Croatia either in the statement from Copenhagen or in the reports of correspondents of the media, which are subject to oversight. Because the parliament is under the oversight of the HDZ, we can expect that the parliament will change its viewpoint just as many times as the Croatian leadership changes its. The reason for that is that, without the will of the present Croatian leadership, there could be no "renewal of the mandate" of the incumbent party's deputies in the next election.

Croatian state propaganda is telling the voters that by yielding in Copenhagen, which greatly gladdened Butrus-Ghali and Milan Babic, Croatia became acceptable to the international community and boosted its

reputation. Dr. Tudjman spoke about inclusion in the programs of the European Union. Surely, Krajina is not going to be given up for the sake of the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program. It was not Croatia that became acceptable to the world community, but only the Croatian leadership. If it is a question of the acceptability of Croatia, then that would be a Croatia without occupied areas.

After Copenhagen, Croatia's crucial domestic political issue is how the parliamentary opposition will react to Croatia's defeat. One of the opposition leaders responded to the suggestion of a public protest rally of citizens and displaced persons by saying that perhaps such a move would be counterproductive. The parliamentary opposition could not be less productive than it is now.

The sincere question of the Croatian voters, who long ago lost confidence in the Croatian leadership, is "Whom to vote for now?" This is because they think that they can expect only the worst from the government, but nothing from the opposition!

Martic Rejects UN Resolution, UNCRO Deployment

AU0704133195 Knin Srpski Radio Krajina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Speech by Croatian Serb leader Milan Martić at rally held in central Knin on 6 April—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear brothers and sisters, I came to this rally without any special preparations, without preparing a speech, and what I will tell you comes straight from my heart and my soul. I will tell you what I really mean and I hope you will accept my sincerity. [cheers, applause]

I do not know what has already been said here and I am aware that I will be held responsible if you said anything against anybody, that I will be accused of staging it all, as I was last time, when they said that I had staged the entire rally. But let them accuse me, I know that I should not be avoiding my people, for those who are afraid of their own people will not succeed. [applause, cheers] My strength and yours is in our unity and it is my duty to represent your will. You appointed me and I have never deviated from your will. As regards the current situation, let me say something about that first, as this is probably what interests you most. I believe that you have all been following events as much as you could in the media. You know that the entire world, which is not unfortunately favorably disposed toward us, with the powerful forces supporting our enemy, now wants to use some resolutions to again put the Serbs on the territory of former Yugoslavia into a ghetto and force us to agree to suffer new genocide. [isolated cheer] Let us not react like that. I fully represent and say to the potentates of this world: Your ideas cannot be realized, no matter how many resolutions you pass, for I am absolutely certain that our

people are right. If we consider the facts, both historical and legal ones, we can negotiate with whoever you want. But to come to terms, for the third time in the 20th century, again to agree to slaughter, by God, no force in this world is powerful enough to convince us to accept that! [applause, cheers]

Unfortunately, others who express support—and believe me, I am saying this from the bottom of my heart—I get sick watching some television programs where they show every night that there is no alternative to peace. [sentence as heard] You know what they mean by that. Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Karadzic and I are not idiots, and neither are you. We all want peace, we never wanted war. But peace at any price, at the cost of waving the white flag, to agree to return to Tudjman's state and agree to another genocide, or that Mr. Karadzic agrees to return to Alija's [Izetbegovic] state and agrees to another genocide: Neither Mr. Karadzic nor I have the right to agree to that. We will not accept that kind of peace! [applause] We do not have the right to accept that, among other things also because of those who have been killed and are unfortunately not here. Unfortunately, many have died, our finest men have given their lives defending the idea of creating a Serbian state, a state in which they will live an honorable life. Because of them, because of the wounded, because of the disabled, we do not have the right to stop half way. We must and we have the right to create our own country in which we will live honorable and normal lives. And that is why we do not accept peace at all costs, a peace that will keep us in subordination, peace in which our children will be taught that people like Mercep and Seks are national heroes! They will not live to see that! [voice shouts indistinct words]

Let those gentlemen have their Security Council. Unfortunately, that Security Council does not exist. I said that already in 1991 and 1992. It is controlled by powerful forces, first of all by the United States, and then also by Germany, which is not a full member, but has a lot of power. And they support our enemies. In view of this, this resolution should not come as a surprise. Butrus-Ghali himself wanted a resolution that would be acceptable to a degree, which would be called UN Peace Forces. However, his demand was disregarded and, at the request of the Croats, a resolution called UNCRO, [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia], United Nations for the Restoration of Confidence in Croatia, was adopted. At the request of Croatia. However, this resolution is worth nothing because absolutely nothing can be implemented on the ground without our approval. And we will not agree to it, of course! [applause, crowd chants "You are right!"]

Stoltenberg, Owen, and Akashi can come here as often as they want. They can even demand to talk to somebody else at the same time. And they do that, for they are trying to avoid having me say that I am a hard-liner and will not allow it. So, at the same time, they want to meet with other people, they are looking for weak points, for

those who would agree to that. But they should be aware that it is up to the people to say and there will be [broadcast interrupted for a few seconds] UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] that can force us by means of a resolution to establish borders between us and our brothers in the Serbian republic [Serbian entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] and in Serbia. [applause]

If those gentlemen really want peace, there is no problem. Let them come out to the separation line and stand between us and our enemy, with whom we will never reconcile or restore confidence, as they think. They can only be our neighboring country. We will never again be a part of the country where we will be domineered over, trodden upon. Let those gentlemen stand on the separation line, if they want peace so much. But to let them spy, establish a border between us and our Serbian brothers from the Serbian republic and Serbia—I am certain that none of you will allow that and I am your representative whom you appointed to tell them what you want in public. [applause]

Unfortunately, some disagree with me, saying that people will agree to coexistence, to UNCRO, and such reports even reach the Security Council. This is the result of those parallel meetings of Mr. Stoltenberg, Akashi, and others, Galbraith and the like, who send out such reports and say that some people have different views, that not everything is as that man Martić says, and that we will negotiate with those others. And they bypass me increasingly often. But they are very much mistaken. I know exactly what people throughout the republic of Serbian Krajina think. I see what people in our proud town of Knin think and the situation is the same in other places! People hold the same views in western Slavonija, Kordun, Banija, Lika, eastern Slavonija, Western Srem, and Baranja. They all think the same. People do not want to return to Croatia. And we have every right not to want that. If everybody in former Yugoslavia had the right to self-determination, the Croats, the Slovenes, even the Muslims, that nonexistent nation, a religious community in my opinion, then the Serbs are also entitled to it. And we will be relentless and determined. We will show the entire world that we are right and we will create our own country. I assure you that we are able and want to do that. To achieve this, we must not deviate from our views. I am aware that you are going through a very difficult time, that we live very hard lives, but we must overcome these hardships together. We must bear this burden together, divide it equally among us. I am strongly opposed to those views that some should enjoy privileges as if there were no war, while a soldier or a worker in Tvik [Knin Screw Factory] has nothing. I fully sympathize with those who have nothing, with the workers of Tvik, with railroad workers, with the soldiers on the front lines. From this moment on, I do not want my salary, if soldiers or Tvik workers get none. [cheers] But that should apply to everybody. To everybody, ministers, people working for municipalities, banks, the public auditing service, and all other services. When the state does not have money, we still have enough food,

enough to survive. And when we have, we will have money for everyone. But I do not want that some—in Belgrade hotels, the Majestic and others—have everything, while you here suffer. I do not allow that and I am against that. Dear brothers and sisters, that is why we must strengthen our army. Today we have our Serbian army that we must support, for that is our only guarantee that we will succeed. Today we have our Serb officers [broadcast interrupted for a few seconds] we must support them. We must support our commands, our army, and strengthen the army every day. If we have a strong, stable army, we have a guarantee that the enemy will never again come onto this side of the border. [broadcast interrupted for a few seconds]

The republic of Serbian Krajina is a reality, whether they like it or not. Nobody is powerful enough to stop the

ongoing process of our unification. Nobody is strong enough to establish a border between us and the Serbian republic and Serbia. There is no doubt that we will—in spite of different views and the fact that it may now seem that we are giving it up. The process of unification that the people of the Serbian republic, the republic of Serbian Krajina, and Serbia and Montenegro, and of all other areas want, the process of unification on the territory of former Yugoslavia. I am certain that this idea of ours—which you all want to see realized, I am sure—will be realized.

So much from me. Thank you all very much. [cheers] You have no reason to be worried. Rest assured that we will make those moves that you want, which means that we will not be tricked by anyone, that we will not accept anything that would harm our people.

Ministry Response to European Court Official*AU0704075695 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in
Macedonian 1430 GMT 6 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] We are very surprised by the remarks by the advocate general of the European Court of Justice regarding the Greek embargo. We do not want to interfere with the legal aspects of the documents of the EU Commission, particularly Article 113 of its charter, or any other Commission regulation, but we do consider his remarks an attempt to apply political pressure.

This case is not a question of the court's authority to solve the dispute between the Republic of Greece and the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], as the advocate general claims. Rather, it is a matter of an appeal by the European Commission against a member state for violating the charter and other EU regulations. We believe that the European Court of Justice will reach a just solution; otherwise it will set a precedent, in EU practice, of encouraging economic blockades and pressure as a means to solve bilateral problems. In these unstable regions of the continent, this could represent the start of new economic violations.

This concludes the statement by the Macedonian Foreign Ministry.

UK Delegation Discusses Defense Cooperation*LD0604151195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in
Serbo-Croatian 1318 GMT 6 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 6 Apr (TANJUG)—A military delegation from Great Britain is visiting The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], it was announced in Skopje today.

The delegation is led by David Henderson, assistant chief of the defense staff of the British Armed Forces.

He had talks today with FYROM Defense Minister Blagoje Handziski. In the talks, satisfaction was expressed over the successful cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere—the statement says, adding that a readiness to sign a memorandum laying out, in concrete terms, cooperation in the defense field was expressed.

The signing of this Macedonian-British document should take place during a scheduled visit to London by Handzinski.

PDA-IL Withdraws Support of Assembly Member*95P20695A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 29 Mar 95 p 4*

[Unattributed report: "PDA-Islamic Path: Tjenan Hasipi Is Not Our Representative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At yesterday's news conference, the Party for Democratic Action-Islamic Path (PDA-IL) announced its decision to withdraw its sponsorship from the coalition's representative, Tjenan Hasipi, who has been representing the PDA-IL up to now in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. Hasipi entered the assembly as a representative of the Democratic Party of Turks and the PDA-IL. While announcing this decision, the party also expressed its view that the parliament has not yet begun to examine the laws regulating educational materials, the use of languages by ethnic groups, local self-government, denationalization, or privatization.... At the end of the communique, the PDA-IL pointed out that further participation by the coalition representative on behalf of the PDA-IL was pointless in view of the existing climate that prevades which negates any guarantee to respect the party's requests.

First Round of Slovene, EU Talks Begins

AU0604210595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Brussels—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first technical round of negotiations between the Slovene and EU representatives about the associate membership agreement began in Brussels today. Our delegation is headed by Benjamin Lukman, director of the Office for European Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, and the EU delegation by a diplomat, (?Serge Abou). Edo Zitnik reports:

[Begin Zitnik recording] Our delegation and the EU negotiating team, which is headed by a great connoisseur of Slovenia, (?Serge Abou), is supposed to study the agreement in principle today, while individual segments of mutual relations will be debated at the forthcoming meetings. Because the true negotiations have only just begun, both sides remain tactically silent on the issues on which there might be differences.

The Union, too, only confirmed that the agreement with Slovenia will be very similar to the agreements signed by the countries of the Visegrad Group and the agreements on which the Baltic states are negotiating.

At the political level, the associate membership agreement will facilitate the establishment of a true political dialogue between Slovenia and the EU. Slovene ministers will attend EU ministerial meetings that will be primarily dedicated to the political problems regarding the entry of new members to the EU.

With the association agreement, Slovenia will also gain the right to a share of the 7.5 billion ECU that the Union earmarked for the preparation of the associate members for full-fledged membership.

The agreement will facilitate the formation of the so-called association council, which will comprise the Slovene and EU representatives and which will prepare and coordinate the future steps of both sides after the signing of the agreement—that is, during its realization.

As Slovenia is, formally speaking, more than three years behind the Visegrad Group countries, it would like to catch up with them, or perhaps even pass them. With a 20 percent annual reduction in restrictions on the import of EU goods, the Visegrad Group countries are expected to establish a free trade zone by the year 2001. If Slovenia also wishes to have a free trade zone by the end of the decade, it will have to agree to a faster pace in the lifting of restrictions because of the three-year lag.

Despite Slovenia's relative economic development, the agreement will almost definitely include the so-called security clause. This means that if the import of certain goods from the EU to Slovenia were to increase to such an extent as to have grave economic and social repercussions, Slovenia would be allowed to limit their import temporarily.

As for agricultural produce, the association agreement envisages a reciprocal exchange of concessions. In everyday language, this means that Slovenia will open its market to agricultural produce from the EU at its own discretion and gradually. Namely, because of the very high subsidies to the EU farmers, the agricultural sector of the associate members would not withstand a rapid opening to EU produce. [end recording]

Drnovsek Views Ministries' Dispute, Jansa

AU0704080895 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 25 Mar 95
p 2

[Interview with Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Vladimir Vodusek; place and date not given: "Struggle Among Parties Will Certainly Increase Further"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana 24 Mar—One year since the resignation of the former defense minister presents an occasion to evaluate events. In this case, Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek would be the best person to talk to. The political balance established following the 1992 elections has been upset, so our first question was if he was facing the most problematic period.

[Drnovsek] There was a lot of opposition already at the time when I was putting the current government together and appointed Jansa defense minister. I put together the government and the coalition in that way in order to ensure greater stability of the government and politics in Slovenia, although it was clear to me that the policy would be more difficult to carry out when the partners are so different. However, this is difficult regardless of whether you are confronted with them or whether you confront them along with each other, although the shocks are weaker if they are within the coalition. Such was the concept of that coalition, as it seemed to me to be a better solution for Slovenia in the transitional period. Despite the difficulties I had with the people who opposed Jansa—and many times with him as well, as he wanted to play a special and political role in the government—this concept seemed to me to be meaningful and positive. Even now, I am trying to preserve the grand coalition of the three big parties in the future as well, although we differ on many points. Since Jansa's replacement, many of the tensions have come out, and greater tensions have arisen between the coalition and opposition than before, although there was certainly a lot of tension in the past as well. However, one cannot say that this period is more difficult for a prime minister than the previous one. In a way, the previous period was even more difficult, as one had to coordinate some impossible things within the government coalition. Now this opposition appears from outside, not inside.

[Vodusek] The Depala vas affair has not had a court epilogue. Neither of the sides very much Sarajevo Radio the dirty laundry to be aired in court, where many details would be brought to light. Today many people wonder what your responsibility in the affair may have been.

[Drnovsek] Responsibility for the affair is borne by the people who caused it. There were political conflicts involved that arose through conflicts among secret services and ministries. I tried to solve these political conflicts within the government and coalition, in agreement with individual participants—and calm them down appropriately. The *Depala* was affair occurred exactly two days after we had carried out the joint visit of reconciliation between the police and MORIS [1st Special Brigade of the Defense Ministry] and after we had reached firm agreements at the political collegium that all such activities should stop, so nothing else was left for me than to intervene with the only concrete means that a prime minister has: that is, the replacement of ministers. Earlier on, one could do nothing else.

At first I found it very difficult to establish why that had happened. Different reports about the same thing were arriving from the two ministries. Who was right? You try to find out, organize meetings with them, and warn them that it leads nowhere. We think that a hurried replacement of ministers, if it were carried out at a previous stage, when I myself was not sure who was right, could easily be a real mistake. I reached a decision about that after the case was openly taken up by the media—something that brought up the question of whether a violent showdown might start in public or this dispute between ministry services might go too far, so that real conflicts would break out in Slovenia. This was something that I, as prime minister, could not allow to happen. It was my duty to stop that, so this is why the change of the defense minister.

There has also been a change in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In that wake, tensions been assuaged, ministries have started working normally, and services are no longer spying on each other. They are no longer competing among themselves. Things have normalized.

[Vodusek] You were somehow in the midst of that conflict between Kucan and Jansa. What, in fact, was your position? Did that conflict suit you?

[Drnovsek] When the conflict between Jansa and Kucan broke out, I was concentrating on the work of the government—the functioning of the state and the coalition and so on—and did not directly interfere in public polemics. This simply meant following political logic; it was not in my interest that one now connected this with *Depala* was and the replacement of Defense Minister Jansa. Proposing Jansa's replacement was not in my interest either, as it was simply to be expected that all of the political energy he and his followers directed at the conflict with Kucan would be redirected at me and that I would thereby become the main target. I found it very difficult to reach a decision about this replacement. However, being the prime minister, somebody who must ensure the functioning of the state and who is ultimately responsible if ministries and services attack each other, I simply could not disregard that. I think that the ensuing consequences were to be expected: the huge political

anger that was directed at and vented on me. I think that I have done entirely what I had to do, and that in such cases the prime minister must take upon himself the responsibility for the functioning of the government and state, although he pays a certain political price for that.

[Vodusek] Would you act the same now? This replacement was one of the first replacements in the cabinet.

[Drnovsek] Perhaps it was due to this that there have really been more replacements, albeit for reasons that I mentioned at Jansa's replacement. Since the *Depala* was case, much harsher guidelines have been set on when a minister should be replaced, and this should be the first to be respected in some other situations as well. Perhaps the criteria set were too strict and things harshened—but on the other hand, there have been many demands by the public and the opposition to the effect that cases of malpractice have been taking place without anybody's being punished for them.

[Vodusek] What about relations with the president? A detail from the affair: Can you confirm the report that a coup d'état was being prepared? Was that discussed at some collegium, or a meeting of the top state leadership?

[Drnovsek] Such reports have been arriving, on some occasions even through our services. According to these reports, certain foreign intelligence services were of the opinion that there was a danger of a military coup or putsch. Some people here were also in a panic. I checked those unverified reports with Defense Minister Jansa; when I asked him about that he denied it. Such rumors and warnings existed, but were never proved. No proof was found in the further investigations by commissions, either.

[Vodusek] There is a year and a half to go until the elections. Can you comment on the work of the coalition and the possibility of extraordinary elections?

[Drnovsek] I do not expect extraordinary or early elections. Nobody is expecting that to happen, but we are all prepared for autumn elections. Tensions will certainly increase at that time. The struggle among parties, by which one will be trying to win points, will increase, and it will be more difficult to lead a government under such conditions. It is the aim of certain politicians and parties to promote themselves and cause as many problems as possible for the government. This will be a difficult period and I hope that the government and the coalition will manage to maintain enough sense and stability, so that the competition will not affect the coalition parties.

Statistics on Privatization Audit Issued

AU0704071495 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 5 Apr 95
p 3

[Article by Silva Ceh: "Auditing Disputes" in the Court"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 4 April—The suspicion of a depletion of public assets proved to be justified in nearly 40 percent of the 551 auditing reports examined, the public defenders concluded over the past year and half. More than half of the questionable parallel companies have been abolished through various forms of settlements proposed by the defenders, and approximately 1.4 billion tolar's worth of damages incurred on the social assets of firms by shady property transformation—and in some cases, true wild privatization—were compensated.

From the beginning of July 1993 to the end of January 1995, the public defenders studied 551 auditing reports and concluded that the suspicion of depletion of public assets was justified in 211 cases. They established that eight such cases involved companies in bankruptcy, and proposed that the remaining 203 firms start compensating for the damages established by the auditing reports. As we have recently reported, this is not easy—among other things, also because a firm can appeal the auditing report during the time (within a month from the receipt of the auditing report) the damages are supposed to be compensated, upon the advice of the public defender.

Some 58 firms—among which there were 14 that were “charged” with a total of 25 bypass firms—nevertheless decided for the proposed compensation of damages. The remaining 145 firms did not opt for the compensation of damages; the public defenders have already pressed charges against most of them. In half of these cases (75), compensation was realized as a result of the charges pressed. On average, seven months were needed for compensation of this type.

So far, the public defenders have lost 14 out of 16 cases where the verdicts are final. We have already reported on the reasons for such a poor performance by the public defenders. In 38 cases, “the auditing disputes” in court did not end before the end of the year. Formally, the Development Fund should be responsible for the property transformation of these companies. However, the public defender's office assessed that only 21 firms met the criteria for this. A question, of course, arises in connection with this—to which the public defenders are also pointing: namely, will some 100 firms that will receive auditing reports only this year lose the opportunity for the so-called autonomous privatization?

[Box, p 3]

Among the above-mentioned 203 firms, the public defenders established the depletion of public assets realized “with the help” of parallel firms in 65 cases (in these cases they identified 141 bypass firms). They resolved 26 of these by applying the so-called nationalization [podružbljanje] models or by merging parallel firms with the main firm—and 17 cases with the combination of other measures. All together, 43 cases of “bypass” firms were resolved. The figures for the compensation of other types of damages are not negligible either. The compensation of damages brought about by the public defenders yielded a total of 114.6 million tolar's worth of purchase prices in 10 cases. In five cases, they agreed to pay profits worth 26.5 million tolar's. In terms of sums, the public defenders were the most successful in restoring debts. Their total value in 39 cases amounted to 881.3 billion tolar's. In 12 cases, the share of public capital increased by 373.8 million tolar's, all together. On account of debts originating from the management agreements, the public defenders in six cases “earned” a good 16 million tolar's.

Kacin Disputes Ministry's Reasons for Car Crash

AU0604200595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning, Slovene Defense Minister Kacin, who is still receiving treatment in Ljubljana Clinical Center, told our radio station some of the circumstances of a car crash on the last day of March [date as heard] in which he sustained serious injuries.

Among other things, Kacin assured us that he was not passing, as was stated in a statement by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He said that statement was rash, and not beneficial to either its issuer or an objective examination of the reasons for the crash.

Defense Minister Kacin also said that it has yet to be ascertained exactly why his vehicle brushed against another vehicle on the road between Bled and Kranj, following which the minister crashed into a bus with Croatian license plates that was driving in the opposite direction.

Kacin also emphasized that this was a traffic accident that should be treated as any other accident, and that he expected the incumbent offices—the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the traffic judge, and others—to clarify the event with him over in the next few days.

Federal

Sparse Foreign Currency Reserves 'Key Problem'

AU0604200095 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 6 Apr 95

[Report by Dusan Citic from Prijepolje—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Citic] Addressing the representatives of the economic and political life of Prijepolje and explaining the concept of the economic policy for this year, Federal Prime Minister Dr. Radoje Kontic emphasized that the market economy production and preservation of dinar are most important, simultaneously with maximally increased production.

According to him, the intervention measures of the Federal Government yielded the expected results, which created the conditions for the abolition of the majority of them and for the passing of new measures that are adjusted to the present economic circumstances, in order to prevent recession trends, liberalize imports, and accomplish a new approach to the monetary and foreign currency policy.

The monetary policy must continue to be restrictive, which means that the monetary mass will be strictly pegged to production trends and that it will not be used to finance public spending, the budget deficit, or interventions in the economy.

Scarce foreign currency reserves remain the central key problem, Dr. Kontic said, and explained that a 33-percent stimulation is not sufficient for legal entities to sell their surplus foreign currency to the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

[Kontic] Devaluation, even in the new conditions, would not be a solution to this problem, either. True enough, it would produce a certain momentary result. However, the Federal Government is convinced that the parities thus disrupted, even if they were to be corrected, would very quickly return, only multiplied. In such conditions, it was not easy to resolve the foreign currency problem of the country. The Federal Government decided for a certain cessation (cesija) of foreign currency. Namely, each legal entity would separate 20 percent of each realized foreign currency influx to strengthen central foreign currency reserves. [passage omitted]

[Citic] Apart from domestic policy, in Prijepolje today, Federal Prime Minister Dr. Radoje Kontic also spoke

about the foreign policy of our country because Yugoslavia's position in the world has changed considerably:

[Kontic] One can truly conclude that the FRY's esteem in the world is growing constantly. The reasons should definitely be sought in our peace-promoting policy, which has been demonstrated so many times, and also in the increasingly present truth about us and the mistakes made by the international community in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis with the hasty recognition of the secession of individual Yugoslav republics.

In brief, the esteem of our country is growing, with which, we believe, we are reaching the critical mass that would mark our final comeback into the international community, which has always been where we belong. We are justified in our expectations that this will happen in the course of this year. [passage omitted]

Import Tariffs on Raw Materials, Parts Cut

AU0604155795 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federal Government has recently suspended some of the intervention measures in the import sector. Regarding the changes in the import regime, we carry a statement by Federal Trade Minister Djordje Siradovic:

[Begin recording] The government assessed there was no longer any need to maintain these intervention measures. For this reason, we introduced considerable liberalization in the import sector. The provision about mandatory consensus for the import of certain goods has more or less expired, that is, a regime of free import was restored for all raw materials and spare parts, and producers are no longer bound to seek permission to import raw materials and spare parts.

On the other hand, the contingents' obligation remains only for consumer goods and some luxury goods. A decree about applying import taxes and tariffs is also no longer in power; that is to say, it has been changed. Therefore, as of now, taxes and tariffs paid on imported raw materials and spare parts that are not produced in the country will amount to only (75.5 percent), which is the level that prevailed before the introduction of intervention measures. We believe that this will facilitate a greater import of raw materials and spare parts, which will in turn encourage domestic production, which will further, we believe, create preconditions for increased exports. All these measures, are, therefore, aimed at strengthening the dinar. [end recording]

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